Background Reading
Read the following article before completing the discussion: Kate Nishimura (May 4, 2026). It Will Take More Than Tariffs to Bring Back US Textile Manufacturing, Industry Insiders Say. Sourcing Journal.
Discussion
Based on the article, do you think tariffs are an effective strategy for strengthening the U.S. textile industry and the Western Hemisphere textile and apparel supply chain today? Why or why not?
In your comment:
- Clearly explain your viewpoint
- Apply at least one key concept learned from our lectures in April/May
- Use specific examples, data, or arguments from the article to support your viewpoint
You may also address any of the following aspects in your comment:
- Why do some U.S. industry stakeholders, such as NCTO, prefer U.S. apparel sourcing from the Western Hemisphere over Asia?
- How do trade agreements such as USMCA or CAFTA-DR support regional textile and apparel supply chains in the Western Hemisphere?
- What are the advantages and limitations of producing textiles in the United States while assembling apparel in nearby countries in the Western Hemisphere?
- Do you think tariffs encourage long-term investment in U.S. textiles, or do they mainly create short-term adjustments in sourcing strategies?
- How could rising geopolitical tensions and supply chain disruptions increase the importance of Western Hemisphere sourcing?
FASH455 Global Apparel & Textile Trade and Sourcing 
Yes there are some apparel products that can be made in the USA, however this not our sweet spot, nor should it be. There are so many other products like technology that we have had worldwide success. I say play in the space you are good at. Not everything. I have designed, bought and sold over $300 million of direct of outside of the USA. Not because of price alone, but skill in the category.
Tariffs alone are not enough to shift textile and apparel manufacturing back into the US. In this article, we can see that not only has this reduced manufacturing in the US, it has also caused an increase in imports from the asian countries the tariffs are specifically worried about. Manufacturing overseas with a tariff is still cheaper for many. Additionally, the overall increasing volatility of the US economic policy, both domestically and internationally, is pushing companies away from manufacturing in the US to working with US companies. It is harming the US economy. A key concept from class is the objectives for US economic policy. One is leveling the playing field for US companies. While the IEEPA tariff policy was implemented in search of this, it does so in a flawed way. The US textile and apparel manufacturing industry does not have the means to support the scale and skill needed to supply the US apparel needs. It harms companies by driving their costs up regardless of where they source.
One course concept is that trade policymaking is an art of balancing. The lecture explained that there is no simple “good” or “bad” trade policy because different stakeholders benefit or lose in different ways. Trade policies like tariffs are meant to ‘level the playing field’ for U.S. producers, however, they can also increase costs and create more challenges for fashion brands. This concept connects directly to the article because the tariffs placed on Asian countries did not lead to major growth in U.S. textile manufacturing. Instead, many companies shifted sourcing within Asia to countries like Vietnam, Cambodia, Bangladesh and more, because they still offered lower costs and strong capacity for production. The article also explained that U.S. textile output declined while imports from Asian countries increased. This shows how trade policy can create unintended outcomes even when the goal is to support domestic manufacturing. A policy implication is that tariffs alone are not enough to rebuild the U.S. textile industry. The article suggests companies also need stable trade policy, investment incentives, and stronger Western Hemisphere supply chains through agreements like USMCA and CAFTADR. Without long term stability, companies may continue prioritizing lower cost sourcing regions over domestic production.
In class, we have learned that historically, the United States has typically had a trade policy of trade liberalization. Trade liberalization is when trade restrictions are reduced or removed. With low trade restrictions, the market becomes more competitive, leading to consumer benefits. One group that doesn’t benefit from this market is domestic producers, and the current solution is to place tariffs on imports. Tariffs have been rising on many countries and industries. The countries that make up most of the textile industry, Vietnam, Bangladesh, Indonesia, and others, have had continuously rising tariffs. The idea that tariffs would support domestic producers in gaining market share has not worked as of late. Foreign producers have experienced growth in the textile industry, and the US industry has not strengthened at all. Foreign producers have been able to “eat” the cost of tariffs, assuming that the tariffs won’t last, as they have been very unstable. This instability has also “paralyzed” the switch to US producers, as the long run would be worse off for those who make the switch because prices would be uncompetitive if the tariffs were to be removed. This shows that tariffs have not worked as expected and that solutions should be found elsewhere to strengthen the US textile industry.
High tariffs by themselves are not enough to rebuild the US textile industry. The article highlights that tariffs have caused an increase in sourcing diversification, but not necessarily in favor of the US. According to the article “emerging sourcing destinations like Cambodia, Indonesia or India — they have built capacity and they’re supported by investors from China,” Lu told Sourcing Journal. He believes that’s the reason these countries saw export growth to the U.S. skyrocket last year.” With China’s high tariffs, manufacturing has shifted to other countries such as Vietnamese and Indonesia who export to the US. One key concept from class that relates to this is the “flying geese model”. The model is a dynamic regional division of labor in manufacturing based on hierarchy of economic development in the region, specifically Asia. As more advanced economies make more capital and technology products the supply chain changes overtime. Although the US is an advanced country, there are other countries that are more favorable for production. Additionally, we discussed the concept of the “Unsinkable factory Asia”. External products entering Asia market have to pay high tariff and compete with cheaper, locally made products. Thus, the US has a difficult time selling textile products to countries in Asia. The article also highlighted that “Kearney’s 2026 Reshoring Index, released last week, showed domestic output growth is still in the negative, with 2025 showing little improvement over 2024. More explicitly stated: American producers didn’t benefit from the whipsawing tariff policy changes.” Even with high tariffs, US is still having difficulties increasing domestic output. Furthermore, I do not think tariffs encourage long term investment in the US textile industry as tariffs are dynamic and fluctuate often. One thing that does support supply chains in the Western Hemisphere is trade agreements such as the USMCA. These agreements often require “yarn-forward” rules to be followed or for apparel to use U.S. yarns or fabrics in order to qualify for duty-free treatment. This helps sustain demand for U.S. textile mills even when garment assembly occurs outside the country. Overall, I do not think tariffs are enough to support the US textile industry but there are other factors that could help promote its growth.
One concept we covered in FASH 455 is factor proportions theory, which basically says that countries are going to be better at producing things that use whatever they have the most of, so countries with a lot of cheap labor will naturally dominate labor-intensive industries like apparel manufacturing. This is exactly why the tariffs talked about in the article did not work the way the government hoped, because even with steep duties placed on Asian countries, U.S. apparel output dropped 17 percent and Asian imports still grew by $60 billion. Tariffs can make imports more expensive, but they cannot change the fact that countries like Vietnam and Bangladesh simply have a structural cost advantage that the U.S. cannot compete with overnight. If policymakers actually want to bring apparel manufacturing back to the U.S., there needs to be real long-term investment in things like automation and workforce development, otherwise these tariffs just end up raising prices for brands and consumers without actually solving the problem.
One concept we learned in class that relates to this article is the flying geese model, that explains how production shifts across Asia as countries develop and move into different stages of manufacturing. Even though the U.S. is an advanced economy, many apparel companies still find Asia more favorable for cost-efficient production. The article also states that U.S. textile, fabric, and mill output declined by 4% while apparel output decreased by 17%, showing tariffs did not create the expected reshoring growth. Tariffs do not encourage long-term investment because they often change and create uncertainty for brands and manufactures. Tariffs may shift sourcing in the short-term but they are not enough to rebuild the industry alone.
I don’t believe tariffs by themselves offer a sustainable solution for boosting the U.S. textile industry or the textile and apparel supply chain in the Western Hemisphere. Although tariffs might initially prompt companies to rethink their sourcing, the article points out that many are simply moving their sourcing within Asia, instead of returning production to the U.S. or neighboring countries. Dr. Sheng Lu’s data indicates that Asia made up 72.6% of U.S. apparel imports in 2025, with Vietnam, Bangladesh, Indonesia, India, and Cambodia hitting a record 50.6% share of those imports. This demonstrates that companies are still placing greater importance on production capacity, cost-effectiveness, and reliable supplier networks rather than being deterred by tariffs. A key concept from our class, global sourcing and supply chain diversification, is highly relevant here. Companies diversify their sourcing to mitigate risks and maintain adaptability, yet they continue to favor regions that offer strong manufacturing infrastructure and a skilled labor pool. The lectures also highlighted that successful textile and apparel industries hinge on comprehensive supply chains and strong regional trade integration. Agreements like USMCA and CAFTA-DR facilitate this by allowing textiles made in the U.S. to be assembled into apparel in nearby countries, such as Mexico or Central America, with tariff benefits. This regional approach shortens lead times and minimizes supply chain disruptions compared to sourcing from Asia. However, the article also points out that the Western Hemisphere currently doesn’t have enough production capacity to replace Asia on a large scale. In conclusion, I think tariffs might lead to short-term changes in sourcing, but revitalizing the U.S. textile industry requires long-term investment in workforce development, technology, infrastructure, and regional trade partnerships, rather than just depending on tariffs.
One of the big takeaways from class that really connects with this post is the idea of comparative advantage. We’ve spent a lot of time discussing how trade works best when countries stick to what they have the lowest opportunity cost in, essentially playing to their relative strengths, even if they aren’t the absolute best at everything. This post is a perfect case study of that. Despite the aggressive tariffs we saw in 2025, U.S. apparel manufacturing still managed to drop by 17%. The data basically confirms that the “Big Five” Asian suppliers have such a massive lead in labor-intensive assembly that tariffs can’t really touch it. Even with trade barriers in place, the opportunity cost for the U.S. to shift capital and labor back into garment sewing is just too high to spark any real domestic comeback. Moving forward, I’m skeptical about how long this “China Plus One” sourcing can actually last. As the post points out, a lot of that “diversified” production is still fueled by Chinese investment. If fashion brands actually want to decouple, they’ll probably have to look toward vertical integration in the Western Hemisphere. Just swapping one Asian factory for another doesn’t change the underlying economic reality: you can’t just “policy” your way out of decades of specialized regional expertise.
Based on the article and class lectures, I believe tariffs alone are not an effective strategy for strengthening the U.S. textile industry or the Western Hemisphere supply chain. While I recognize that higher tariffs on Asian imports would push brands to source closer to home, the results demonstrate that this strategy would not be beneficial.
The biggest indicator that tariffs are not an effective strategy for strengthening the US textile industry is the statistics. Based on the study, Asian imports did not decline under tariff pressure, but instead increased as 72.6 percent of U.S. apparel imports came from Asia in 2025,while U.S. apparel manufacturing fell by 17 percent. Additionally, CAFTA-DR sourcing dropped by 6.7 percent in value. Instead of bringing production back to the U.S. or even shifting orders to Latin America, brands moved production within Asia, shifting from China to countries like Vietnam, Bangladesh, and Cambodia. This connects to our lectures on global sourcing strategy as companies do not rebuild supply chains overnight because of a tariff, but instead move to the source that has the capacity and the lowest cost.
One concept from our lectures that applies is the idea that production capacity is structural and takes a long time to build. This ideal was demonstrated in studies of the EU textile and apparel industry. The EU developed strong intra-region trade over decades, reaching 53.6 percent for apparel by 2024. This growth was not because of tariffs but because of sustained investment, regional trade agreements, and proximity between Western and Eastern European producers. The Western Hemisphere has not used this framework, so even with trade agreements like USMCA and CAFTA-DR, the cost and capacity gap with Asia is too large for a 10% tariff difference to overcome.
Overall, tariffs are one part of a broader policy approach, but they cannot rebuild the U.S. textile industry on their own. Some practical solutions the article points to are strengthening the Berry Amendment to create stable domestic demand, preserving duty-free treatment under regional trade agreements, and incentives that reward brands for using U.S.-made fabric regardless of where final assembly occurs.
Brinkley, I agree with you that tariffs aren’t enough to strengthen the U.S. textile industry. The article makes that clear, U.S. apparel output fell 17% while 72.6% of imports still came from Asia, even with high tariffs. Like you said, brands didn’t reshore; they just shifted from China to Vietnam, Bangladesh, and Cambodia. Your point about structural production capacity is exactly what we’ve learned in class. The Western Hemisphere doesn’t have the long‑term investment or scale that Asia or even the EU built over decades, so a 10% tariff can’t close that gap. Even CAFTA‑DR and USMCA can’t overcome the cost and capacity differences. I also agree that real solutions look more like stable demand policies, like strengthening the Berry Amendment or improving regional incentives, rather than relying on tariffs that only cause short‑term sourcing shifts.
A key concept we learned in this course for the months of April and May that apply to this article is the yarn forward rule. Under this rule, yarn and fabric have to be produced within the member countries for the apparel to qualify within the free trade region to qualify for duty-free treatment. This policy encourages regional sourcing across the western hemisphere instead of heavily relying on Asia. The Yahoo finance article argues tariffs alone have not successfully rebuilt US manufacturing because many industries, including textiles and apparel, have already shifted overseas. According to the article, manufacturing jobs have continued to decline, after new tariffs were introduced. Tariffs may change sourcing strategies temporarily, but they cannot automatically re-create what has already been used. Regional agreements are more effective because they combine tariff benefits with structured sourcing rules, such as yarn-forward rules. An important question to help continue this discussion would be are consumers willing to pay higher prices for apparel made through Western Hemisphere supply chains instead of lower cost to Asian imports?
I do not think tariffs are an effective long‑term strategy for strengthening the U.S. textile industry or the Western Hemisphere supply chain. The article makes it clear that even aggressive tariff hikes failed to revive U.S. manufacturing. In fact, U.S. textile and apparel output declined, with textile production falling 4% and apparel output dropping 17%, while imports from Asian low‑cost countries actually grew by $60 billion (from the document: “Manufacturing gross output for textiles… declined by 4 percent, while apparel fell markedly by 17 percent”). This shows that tariffs didn’t shift sourcing back to the U.S., they simply reshuffled sourcing within Asia. A key concept from class that helps explain this is comparative advantage. The U.S. no longer has a comparative advantage in labor‑intensive textile production due to higher wages, limited capacity, and decades of offshoring. Tariffs can raise costs for importers, but they cannot recreate the large, integrated supply chains that countries like Vietnam, Bangladesh, and China have built over decades. As the article notes, “Asia remains a dominant source… 72.6% of U.S. apparel imports came from Asia in 2025,” and production simply shifted to other Asian hubs rather than returning to the U.S. The article also reinforces why many U.S. stakeholders, like NCTO, prefer Western Hemisphere sourcing. Agreements like CAFTA‑DR and USMCA support a regional supply chain through yarn‑forward rules, which help U.S. textile mills supply fabric to nearby apparel factories. This model offers speed‑to‑market and tariff benefits. But even with these advantages, the Western Hemisphere still struggles to compete with Asia’s scale and cost structure. Overall, the evidence suggests tariffs mostly create short‑term sourcing adjustments, not long‑term investment in U.S. manufacturing. Companies diversify to avoid tariff risk, but they do not relocate production to the U.S. because the structural cost gap is too large. As noted in the article, companies are expanding sourcing to more than 10 countries, but “Asia remains a dominant source,” showing that diversification does not equal reshoring. Given rising geopolitical tensions, Western Hemisphere sourcing may become more important, but tariffs alone won’t rebuild U.S. textile manufacturing. Real change would require investment in technology, workforce development, and regional integration, not just punitive trade measures.
I don’t think tariffs alone are an effective long-term strategy for strengthening the US textile industry or the Western Hemisphere supply chain. One concept from class that connects to this is the Flying Geese model, which explains how production shifts to lower-cost countries over time. That helps explain why so much textile and apparel production moved out of the US in the first place, and why it’s hard to bring it back just by adding tariffs. The article points out that while tariffs might cause some short-term sourcing changes, they don’t fix the bigger issue of higher production costs in the US Industry insiders mention that rebuilding domestic manufacturing would take major investment and infrastructure, not just trade barriers. Because of this, a lot of companies are looking more at the Western Hemisphere instead, especially since trade agreements like USMCA and CAFTA-DR make regional sourcing easier and faster. Overall, tariffs seem more like a short-term fix than a real solution. It probably makes more sense for companies to focus on strengthening regional supply chains, where the US handles higher-value production and nearby countries handle assembly.
One key concept from our class that relates to this blog post is how trade policy works. In class, we’ve discussed that trade policy is important because we learn to expand our market. We also highlighted with talking about “balancing” that “No simple “good” or “bad” trade policy, but winners and losers”. In this blog post you can see that with tariff policies were put into place in 25′ and 26′ and how that cause major dilema with the global trade. With this, in a way you can see that the trade policy put in place is a loser moment. textile dropped 4%, apparel manufacturing by 17%, and manufactured goods decreased by $28 billion. Going forward if we continue the pattern of limiting trade from other countries we will see way more decreasing in the apparel industry.