The new punitive tariffs on Chinese steel and aluminum: The overcapacity problem in the steel industry globally could raise national security concerns. While the Biden Administration is more focused on outreach to allies and partners to address the issue collectively, the Trump Administration took a different approach with the Section 232 tariffs specifically targeting China. However, the impact of China-targeted measures could be muted due to the limited amount of US steel imported from China today. The next administration is expected to face the challenge of addressing global overcapacity in various industries. Like it or not, tariffs seem to be one of the few tools available to the US government to tackle these issues directly.
Currency debate: “Currency manipulation” refers to the deliberate actions taken by a country’s government or central bank to artificially influence the value of its currency in the foreign exchange market. When a foreign government deliberately lowers the value of its currency, it could result in more US imports from that country and hurt the price competitiveness of US exports. While currency manipulation has not been a significant concern in recent years, the recent strength of the US dollar against other currencies, such as the Japanese yen, Chinese yuan, and Vietnamese dong, may reignite debate over the issue. The Biden Administration struggles to fight high inflation using high-interest rates, making it extremely challenging to “devalue the US dollar” in a macro sense. In comparison, the second Trump administration could designate countries of concern as currency manipulators, followed by new retaliatory measures, including tariffs or other trade barriers.
Industrial policy and subsidy: The Biden administration has packaged industrial policy as a core pillar of “Bidenomics,” which has pledged more than $805 billion in new subsidies for semiconductor manufacturing and research, climate and energy investments, and infrastructure spending. In comparison, the Republicans would be more inclined to let market forces determine the outcome of these policies rather than funding them through the government. It is also likely that the second Trump administration will tighten certain rules related to foreign entities taking advantage of US tax credits. However, there could be coordinated investments and supply chain resilience efforts in Biden and Trump’s second term, such as tactical coordination to prevent global subsidy races and disruptions in supply chains.
Trade policy as a tool for other issues: Reviving the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) or similar mid-2010s era trade agreements was slim during the Biden administration. Instead, the Biden administration prioritizes a climate and trade agenda, as evidenced by the launch of a new White House Climate and Trade Task Force. Biden administration will continue to prioritize investments in domestic production capacity while looking outward to use trade to support other non-trade objectives.
In comparison, the Trump administration was more aggressive in pushing back against protectionist trade measures against US products but also less optimistic about the willingness of other countries to engage in good-faith negotiations with the US. Further, Trump 2.0 will likely return to trade policies similar to his first term, including potential tariffs of up to 60% on Chinese imports and an across-the-board tariff of 10% on all imports. Further, there is bipartisan support for increasing tariffs on Chinese goods, considering the deteriorating bilateral relationship. However, a 10% global tariff on imports from countries like Switzerland and Ireland could be more controversial due to potential consumer price impacts and damage to US alliances.
Discussion questions:
Any of the aforementioned issues could potentially impact fashion apparel companies? Why?
In your view, is it preferable for the textile and apparel industry not to be a focus of US trade policy? Why?
What are your top 1-2 takeaways from the panel discussion?
Speaker: Katherine Tai (U.S. Trade Representative, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative)
Presider: Michael Froman (President, Council on Foreign Relations; Former U.S. Trade Representative, 2013-17)
Excerpt from the conversation
Worker-Centric US trade policy
Question from FROMAN: “Back in the old days, there was a notion that since the U.S. market is relatively open—we don’t have that much protection here, the average applied tariff is about 3 ½ percent—that if we were able to reduce barriers to other countries disproportionately we could export more made by U.S. workers, and that export-related jobs paid more than non-export related jobs, and that we could use access to our market as a way of getting other countries to reform their labor practices and raise their standards, which would create a more level playing field. That theory is sort of out of vogue at the moment. But, tell me, can you envisage what an agreement that is worker-centric looks like that reduces barriers or increases trade?”
Response from TAI: “The percentage of (U.S.) exports to GDP is around 10 percent—maybe 11 or 12 percent. So it’s not very high. Some of our—some of our trading partners have very, very high exports as a proportion of GDP (e.g., 25 percent)…So you just have to put that (trade liberalization) into context. I think you also have to think about the fact of the balance of exports and imports…”
“We’re trying to create and maintain jobs, and good jobs, at home… so then the question becomes not what do I have to pay you to do X, Y, or Z, but how can we put the forces of our cooperation together? What does the deal look like where we are building our middle classes together? And I think that the worker pieces then come in, along with the environment pieces, as something that I shouldn’t have to pay you to do, but as something that you should want to do…”
“Traditionally we’ve kept our scorecard by, you know, how many trade agreements you finished and how many you’ve gotten across the finish line… Our progress lies very much in how the conversation has fundamentally shifted. That the conversation now is very much focused on supply chain resilience, on equity, and how not to leave those within our economies behind further, how not to leave those developing countries behind further.”
Digital trade
Question from FROMAN: “For a long time, the U.S. had a position around the free flow of data across borders, not taxing digital products across borders… given the fact that the U.S. economy is probably—certainly the leader in all things digital, what does it mean for us to move away from defending these principles that have been so core to what we’ve tried to do before?”
Response from TAI: “So in early 2000s that we’re negotiating (digital trade)… It’s called the e-commerce chapter. And it’s the e-commerce chapter in several iterations of FTAs (free trade agreements)…And I think that that makes sense if you think about what the digital economy looked like in the early 2000s. It really was about e-commerce…At the time—thought about e-commerce digital trade provisions as largely facilitative provisions. The flow of data was there, and we wanted to safeguard the flow of data to facilitate traditional trade transactions, the movement of goods across borders, the analogy to services we used also in digital.”
“In 2024, one of the things that you realize is that the flow of data, the decisions around where data needs to be stored, how it needs to be handled, has—on much, much different dimensions because over this period of time, in fact, in the digital economy the data is no longer just about facilitating traditional types of transactions. The data has become the commodity in and of itself. The data is now what has value. The ability to accumulate that data and for vast amounts of data then to be combined with computing power to create things like generative AI and large language models, it starts to give you a sense, just as a normal trade negotiator, that there are much, much bigger equities at stake in what we might be doing in our trade negotiations…It’s not just about facilitating trade, but around how we regulate data and how we regulate the companies that accumulate, harvest, and trade in this data is something that we need to resolve and advance before we can thoughtfully and responsibly engage in trade negotiations to figure out what the limits are in terms of what we should be doing, and what the goals are for what we should be doing with our trading partners… what underlies the digital economy and our digital existences, and just thinking about what the rules should be for how that data is handled, who has rights to that data, and then the international components around trade and prosperity but also trade and national security.”
Tradeoffs in trade policy
Question from FROMAN: “Trade is a great area to talk about tradeoffs. We hate being overly dependent on China for basic goods. We also hate inflation and higher cost of living. The actions taken to deal with the first one will likely exacerbate the second one… How do you talk about that tradeoff with communities around the country? And do you make explicit that, yes, you’re going to pay more at Walmart for this for that, but we’re going to become less dependent on China as a result?”
Response from TAI: “That today, we know that we have critical dependencies and vulnerabilities that are actually bad from a national security and just a geopolitical standpoint. For every sector where we feel that we are critically vulnerable to another country and, say, China in particular, I think that it creates a sense of angst and insecurity that is destabilizing for the world economy and, frankly, for the world… if you look at it from a more holistic, medium-term perspective, supply chain diversity and supply chain resilience is actually a management tool for inflation… “
“For as long as there are concentrated pockets for production and supply—and this is internationally, but this is also the logic behind taking on dominant players in our economy—for as long as you have that kind of dominance, you’re going to have in the hands of certain players the ability to distort the market and to take advantage of that dominance by jacking up prices, whether it’s shrinkflation, or greedflation, or in the international context economic coercion… if you think about the tradeoff as between today and tomorrow, it’s not zero-sum at all. And in fact, these changes are ones that we need to be able to manage, not being faced with the same risks over and over and over again.”
US trading partners
Comment from TAI: “when you talk about some evolution in our (trade policy) approach, I just want to be clear, the evolution in our approach is about what should be in those things, what should be in those agreements, what should be in the exercises and the cooperation that we undertake with our partners. This is not a walking away from those partners, at all…You’ll see how much time I spend in Brussels, how much time I’ve spent in Asia, and the Indo-Pacific over the course of the last three years. And you’ll see that the prioritization of our like-minded partners, our traditional partners if you will, is still very much there.”
Tariffs
Comment from TAI: “What is really important to appreciate about tariffs is that they’re a tool. They’re a tool that can be used in constructive ways… They’re a tool, at least for us, in trade remedies… They are a tool for remedying unfair trade. I actually kind of like the way the Europeans describe these types of tools—dumping, countervail. They call them trade defense instruments.”
“What I also want to reflect is that trade policy and economic policy isn’t just tariffs… we have kept a lot of the tariffs, because we see strategic value in those tariffs in this exercise of building up the middle class and reinvigorating American manufacturing and the American economy… it needs to take the tariffs as a tool, the investments as another tool to help reinforce, policies that support and empower all workers, and to encourage our partners to be supporting and empowering their workers, and then also promoting economic vitality, opportunity through the enforcement of our competition laws…”
Textile industry strategic or not?
Comment from TAI: “You know, there are things that are more strategic, things that maybe we feel like are less strategic or not strategic. But, you know, I think that is actually a really, really important question. And it’s a hard one—what’s strategic and what isn’t? We clearly did not think that surgical masks—surgical, you know, medical-grade gloves and ventilators were that strategic. And so we let that go wherever it was going to go. And in the early days of the pandemic, boy, did that hurt us a lot. So, you know, one of the—one of the stories that came out of the pandemic was all of our—all of our textile manufacturers, you know, were told your industry is not that strategic. They’d been told it for a long time. And yet, we know that it is important. It’s politically important. And USTR has for a very long time had a textiles office and textiles negotiator…it was that textiles industry, what we still have, that was able to repurpose their capabilities and to step up, and to actually start producing some of these things that we were really deficient in during the pandemic, and to save us. So I think that where you draw the lines on strategic and nonstrategic… It’s not necessarily obvious.”
Video discussion questions [For students in FASH455, please address at least two of the following questions in your response]
#1: Tai emphasizes the importance of creating and maintaining good jobs at home and building middle classes together with trading partners. How can the textile and apparel trade contribute to the goal?
#2: Reflecting on the textile industry’s response during the pandemic, Tai raises questions about what industries are considered strategic and the implications of such categorizations. How should policymakers determine which industries are strategic, and what criteria should be used in making these decisions?
#3: How has the role of data evolved in trade discussions, and what are the potential challenges in regulating data in international trade agreements? What are the implications of digital trade governance on today’s fashion business?
#4: Tai discusses the strategic importance of supply chain diversity and resilience. How might diversifying supply chains contribute to national security and economic stability, and what are the challenges in achieving this diversification? Please use the textile and apparel sector as an example.
#5: Any other reflections, thoughts, or feedback on the conversation?
Beth Hughes serves as the Vice President of the American Apparel and Footwear Association (AAFA), responsible for supporting the association’s efforts on international trade and customs issues. Beth oversees AAFA’s Trade Policy Committee, as well as AAFA’s Customs Group. Beth is also the spokesperson of the Coalition for Economic Partnership in the Americas (CEPA), a group of prominent American companies, and manufacturers committed to advancing regional trade and employment opportunities in the Western Hemisphere.
Before joining AAFA, Beth served for six years as senior director of international affairs at the International Dairy Foods Association. Beth earned a Bachelor of Arts degree in political science at George Washington University and received a Master of Arts in international affairs from Florida State University.
The interview was conducted by Leah Marsh, a graduate student in the Department of Fashion and Apparel Studies at the University of Delaware. Leah’s research focused on exploring EU retailers’ sourcing strategies for clothing made from recycled textile materials and fashion companies’ supply chain and sourcing strategies.
Julia K. Hughes is President of the United States Fashion Industry Association (USFIA), which represents brands, retailers, importers, and wholesalers based in the United States and doing business globally. She represents the industry in front of the U.S. government as well as international governments and stakeholders, explaining how fashion companies create high quality jobs in the United States and economic opportunities around the world.
An expert on textile and apparel trade issues, Julie has testified before Congress and the Executive Branch. She frequently speaks at international conferences including the China & Asia Textile Forum, Fashion Institute of Technology (FIT), Harvard University’s Bangladesh Development Conference, MAGIC, Prime Source Forum, Vietnam Textile Summit, and others.
Julie served as the first President and is one of the founders of the Washington Chapter of Women in International Trade (WIIT) and is one of the founders of the WIIT Charitable Trust. She also was the first President of the Organization of Women in International Trade (OWIT). In 1992, she received the Outstanding Woman in International Trade award and in 2008, the WIIT Lifetime Achievement Award. She also is a member of the International Women’s Forum.
Julia has an M.A. in International Studies from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and a B.S. in Foreign Service from Georgetown University.
The interview was conducted by Leah Marsh, a graduate student in the Department of Fashion and Apparel Studies at the University of Delaware. Leah’s research focused on exploring EU retailers’ sourcing strategies for clothing made from recycled textile materials and fashion companies’ supply chain and sourcing strategies.
Below are selected comments by US Trade Representative Katharine Tai (Tai) and WTO (World Trade Organization) Director-General Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala (Ngozi).
What kind of global trade do we want today?
“For decades, the United States has been proud to champion the international rules-based order and the multilateral trading system…But the functioning and fairness of this order are now in question and that is why all of us need to adapt to a more challenging era marked by rapid technological change, increasing extreme climate events, vulnerable supply chains, intensifying geopolitical friction, widening inequality” (Tai)
“The United States is writing a new story on trade. We are pursuing fair competition, addressing the climate crisis, promoting our national security, and ensuring the rules-based system helps all economies, not just the biggest ones.” (Tai)
“how can we harness the effectiveness of our trade tools to be promoting not just efficiency and liberalization, but using those tools to promote what we consider certainly today to be higher goals. And those goals are resilience for our economy and the word economy, sustainability, again, for our economy in the world economy, and inclusivity… we started to see where the concentrations in supply and production started to impact this and spike this economic insecurity on a macro level and also for individuals” (Tai)
Trade and climate change
“trade is necessary to disseminate green technologies and through competition and scale efficiencies to drive down the cost of decarbonization. Another reason is that trade amplifies the impact of environmental policy action. Recent research at the WTO demonstrate that just as countries can reap economic gains by focusing on what they are relatively good at, the world can reap environmental gainsif countries focus on what they are relatively green at” (Ngozi)
Is trade diversification the future?
“A fragmented world economy would not just be bad for already-squeezed household budgets. Without trade, it would become harder, even impossible, to meet the big challenges of our time – resilience, socioeconomic inclusion, and climate change… The problems we encountered in the trading system were less about trade per se and more about excessive concentration for some products and supply relationships. The smart response is to deepen, diverse, and deconcentrate production so there are fewer potential bottlenecks” (Ngozi)
“we believe we can solve the problem by diversifying the supply chains not just to ourselves or to friends but to all over the world where the opportunity exists. Business should look at the possibility of not just doing China+1. It means China plus Vietnam or Indonesia. But they can do Bangladesh. They can do Laos. They can do Rwanda. They can do Senegal. They can do Nigeria. I’m just – Morocco” (Ngozi)
Debate the impact of trade
“Technology was generally a big culprit in job losses…U.S. manufacturing output, the volume of products produced here, is about as high as it has ever been. But the sector employs more machines and fewer people than it used to. Nevertheless, import competition was a significant factor and an easier focus, I think, for political anger.” (Ngozi)
“…between 1995 and 2011, while increased goods import from China did eliminate 2 million jobs in the United States, increased exports to China and elsewhere added 6.6 million jobs to the U.S. economy, 4 million of them from higher-services exports…These numbers illustrate the power of trade for job creation. But as we know, those new jobs were not created in the same places. Neither did they go to the same people. That a backlash would result from those left out was perhaps predictable, but it was not inevitable. There are countries that use domestic-policy levers to translate gains from trade into broadly shared growth by providing people security against income loss and support to seize new opportunities.” (Ngozi)
Renew or update the African Growth and Opportunity Act?
“The world is really different from when AGOA was first created…So I think copy-paste is to really lose an important opportunity…we should be practical. Also, we’re on a timeline…The AfCFTA, the African Continental Free Trade Area, that has been concluded, that has that has been brought into being by the countries on the continent. And those continental integration aspirations should absolutely be reflected in our offer to Africa, and something we should try to figure out how to incorporate” (Tai)
“African countries appreciate AGOA. They would like to see an agreement that is, you know, at least a decade out so that they have some predictability. What they’re hearing from investors is that with this up in the air, they can’t make up their minds whether to invest or not because they don’t know what will happen. So I think if we can reform and get it done, and people can have a predictable time horizon for AGOA, it would really help” (Ngozi)
How to reform the World Trade Organization?
“The United States wants a WTO where dispute settlement is fair and effective, and supports a healthy balance of sovereignty, democracy, and economic integration where all members embrace transparency, where we have better rules and tools to tackle non-market policies and practices, and to confront the climate crisis and other pressing issues.” (Tai)
“We must recognize the diversity of developing members. We should have flexibilities in the rules that reflect actual needs. But we cannot have economic and manufacturing powerhouses gaming the system by claiming the same development status and flexibilities intended for less-advantaged members.” (Tai)
“people ask me all the time, oh, are you worried because there are so many [Free trade agreement, FTA]? I’m not. Like I said, 75 percent of trade still goes on WTO terms [MFN tariff rates]. And we can learn from them.” (Ngozi)
“I don’t have enough time and money to waste resources in Geneva on a process that we don’t actually believe in…When President Biden talks about it from the floor of the United Nations General Assembly, if we still have trading partners who want to question our seriousness, then I think the problem is those partners and it’s not us” (Tai) [note: this comment was mentioned by Politico]
In March 2023, the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) released its 2024 Fiscal Year Budget report, outlining six major goals and objectives for FY2024. USTR’s FY2024 goals and objectives for textile and apparel are similar to FY2023, but keywords such as “near-shoring” are newly emphasized.
Goal 1: Open Foreign Markets and Combat Unfair Trade
Provide policy guidance and support for international negotiations or initiatives affecting the textile and apparel sector to ensure that the interests of U.S. industry and workers are taken into account and, where possible, to provide new or enhanced export opportunities for U.S. industry. (Note: no change from FY2023)
Conduct reviews of commercial availability petitions regarding textile and apparel products and negotiate corresponding FTA rules of origin changes, where appropriate, in a manner that takes into account market conditions while preserving export opportunities for U.S. producers and employment opportunities for U.S. workers. (Note: no change from FY2023)
Engage relevant trade partners to address regulatory issues potentially affecting the U.S. textile and apparel industry’s market access opportunities. (Note: no change from FY2023)
Continue to engage with CAFTA-DR partner countries to address trade-related issues to optimize inclusive economic opportunities; strengthen trade rules and transparency and address non-tariff trade impediments; provide capacity building in areas such as textile and apparel trade-related regulation and practice on customs, border and market access issues, including agricultural and sanitary and phytosanitary regulations, to avoid barriers to trade. (note: newly mentioned “transparency”)
Continue to engage CAFTA-DR partners and stakeholders to identify and develop means to increase two-way trade in textiles and apparel and strengthen the North American supply chain and near-shoring to enhance formal job creation. (note: newly emphasized “Near-shoring”)
Provide policy guidance and support for international negotiations or initiatives affecting the textile and apparel sector to ensure that the interests of U.S. industry and workers are taken into account and, where possible, to provide new or enhanced export opportunities for U.S. industry. (Note: no change from FY2023)
Conduct reviews of commercial availability petitions regarding textile and apparel products and negotiate corresponding FTA rules of origin changes, where appropriate, in a manner that takes into account market conditions while preserving export opportunities for U.S. producers and employment opportunities for U.S. workers (note: no change from FY2023)
Engage relevant trade partners to address regulatory issues potentially affecting the U.S. textile and apparel industry’s market access opportunities. (note: no change from FY2023)
Goal 2: Fully Enforce U.S. Trade Laws, Monitor Compliance with Agreements, and Use All Available Tools to Hold Other Countries Accountable
Closely collaborate with industry and other offices and Departments to monitor trade actions taken by partner countries on textiles and apparel to ensure that such actions are consistent with trade agreement obligations and do not impede U.S. export opportunities. (note: no change from FY2023)
Research and monitor policy support measures for the textile sector, in particular in the PRC, India, and other large textile producing and exporting countries, to ensure compliance with international agreements. (note: no change from FY2023)
Continue to work with the U.S. textile and apparel industry to promote exports and other opportunities under our free trade agreements and preference programs, by actively engaging with stakeholders and industry associations and participating, as appropriate, in industry trade shows. (note: no change from FY2023)
Goal 4: Develop Equitable Trade Policy Through Inclusive Processes
Take the lead in providing policy advice and assistance in support of any Congressional initiatives to reform or re-examine preference programs that have an impact on the textile and apparel sector. (note: no change from FY2023)
Other Priorities for USTR in FY2024:
#1 “Advancing a Worker-Centered Trade Policy.” For example, given “communities of color and lower socio-economic backgrounds were more negatively affected by free trade policies that have reduced tariffs and distributed supply chains across the globe,” USTR will develop “a new strategic approach to trade relationships that is not built on traditional free trade agreements…USTR is embarking on trade engagements with allies and like-minded economies, like Taiwan and Kenya and [through] multinational economic frameworks that focus on clean energy and supply chains rather than tariffs.”
#2 Address forced labor. For example, USTR developed the first-ever focused trade strategy to combat forced labor. Paired with the implementation of the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, and the Memorandum of Cooperation (MOC) launching of a Task Force on the Promotion of Human Rights and International Labor Standards in Supply Chains under the U.S.-Japan Partnership on Trade. And USTR will “use every tool available to block the importation of goods made partially or entirely with forced labor.”
#3 Re-Aligning the U.S. – Beijing Trade Relationship. “USTR continues to keep the door open to conversations with the PRC, including on its Phase One commitments. However, USTR acknowledges the Agreement’s limitations. USTR’s strategy is expand beyond only pressing Beijing for change and includes vigorously defending our values and economic interests from the negative impacts of the PRC’s unfair economic policies and practices.”
#4 Strengthen enforcement of US trade policy. For example, USTR sees enforcement “a key component of our worker-centered trade policy.” USTR is “upholding the eligibility requirements in preference programs,” such as the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). As many enforcement tools were “were crafted decades ago,” USTR will be “reviewing our existing trade tools and working with Congress to develop new tools as needed.”
In December 2022, Just-Style consulted a panel of industry experts and scholars in its Outlook 2023–what’s next for apparel sourcing briefing. Below is my contribution to the report. All comments and suggestions are more than welcome!
2023 is likely another year full of challenges and opportunities for the global apparel industry.
First, the apparel industry may face a slowed world economy and weakened consumer demand in 2023. Apparel is a buyer-driven industry, meaning the sector’s volume of trade and production is highly sensitive to the macroeconomic environment. Amid hiking inflation, high energy costs, and retrenchment of global supply chains, leading international economic agencies, from the World Bank to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), unanimously predict a slowing economy worldwide in the new year. Likewise, the World Trade Organization (WTO) forecasts that the world merchandise trade will grow at around 1% in 2023, much lower than 3.5% in 2022. As estimated, the world apparel trade may marginally increase between 0.8% and 1.5% in the new year, the lowest since 2021. On the other hand, the falling demand may somewhat help reduce the rising sourcing cost pressure facing fashion companies in the new year.
Second, fashion brands and retailers will likely continue leveraging sourcing diversification and strengthening relationships with key vendors in response to the turbulent market environment. According to the 2022 fashion industry benchmarking study I conducted in collaboration with the US Fashion Industry Association (USFIA), nearly 40 percent of surveyed US fashion companies plan to “source from more countries and work with more suppliers” through 2024. Notably, “improving flexibility and reducing resourcing risks,” “reducing sourcing from China,” and “exploring near-sourcing opportunities” were among the top driving forces of fashion companies’ sourcing diversification strategies. Meanwhile, it is not common to see fashion companies optimize their supplier base and work with “fewer vendors.” For example, fashion companies increasingly prefer working with the so-called “super-vendors,” i.e., those suppliers with multiple-country manufacturing capability or can make textiles and apparel vertically, to achieve sourcing flexibility and agility. Hopefully, we could also see a more balanced supplier-importer relationship in the new year as more fashion companies recognize the value of “putting suppliers at the core.”
Third, improving sourcing sustainability and sourcing apparel products using sustainable textile materials will gain momentum in the new year. On the one hand, with growing expectations from stakeholders and pushed by new regulations, fashion companies will make additional efforts to develop a more sustainable, socially responsible, and transparent apparel supply chain. For example, more and more fashion brands and retailers have voluntarily begun releasing their supplier information to the public, such as factory names, locations, production functions, and compliance records. Also, new traceability technologies and closer collaboration with vendors enable fashion companies to understand their raw material suppliers much better than in the past. Notably, the rich supplier data will be new opportunities for fashion companies to optimize their existing supply chains and improve operational efficiency.
On the other hand, with consumers’ increasing interest in fashion sustainability and reducing the environmental impact of textile waste, fashion companies increasingly carry clothing made from recycled textile materials. My latest studies show that sourcing clothing made from recycled textile materials may help fashion companies achieve business benefits beyond the positive environmental impacts. For example, given the unique supply chain composition and production requirements, China appeared to play a less dominant role as a supplier of clothing made from recycled textile materials. Instead, in the US retail market, a substantial portion of such products was “Made in the USA” or came from emerging sourcing destinations in America (e.g., El Salvador, Nicaragua) and Africa (e.g., Tunisia and Morocco). In other words, sourcing clothing made from recycled textile materials could help fashion companies with several goals they have been trying to achieve, such as reducing dependence on sourcing from China, expanding near sourcing, and diversifying their sourcing base. Related, we are likely to see more public dialogue regarding how trade policy tools, such as preferential tariffs, may support fashion companies’ efforts to source more clothing using recycled or other eco-friendly textile materials.
Additionally, the debates on fashion companies’ China sourcing strategy and how to meaningfully expand near-sourcing could intensify in 2023. Regarding China, fashion companies’ top concerns and related public policy debates next year may include:
What to do with Section 301 tariff actions against imports from China, including the tariff exclusion process?
How to reduce “China exposure” further in sourcing, especially regarding textile raw materials?
How should fashion companies respond and mitigate the business impacts of China’s shifting COVID policy and a new wave of COVID surge?
What contingency plan will be should the geopolitical tensions in the Asia-Pacific region directly affect shipping from the region?
Meanwhile, driven by various economic and non-economic factors, fashion companies will likely further explore ways to “bring the supply chain closer to home” in 2023. However, the near-shoring discussion will become ever more technical and detailed. For example, to expand near-shoring from the Western Hemisphere, more attention will be given to the impact of existing free trade agreements and their specific mechanisms (e.g., short supply in CAFTA-DR) on fashion companies’ sourcing practices. Even though we may not see many conventional free trade agreements newly launched, 2023 will be another busy year for textile and apparel trade policy deliberation, especially behind the scene and on exciting new topics.
By Sheng Lu
Discussion question: As we approach the middle of the year, why do you agree or disagree with any predictions in the outlook? Please share your thoughts.
#1. What makes globalization and trade controversial and debatable? Please use 1-2 examples from the video to illustrate your point.
#2. Are classic trade theories (e.g., comparative advantage) still relevant or outdated in the 21st century? Why? Please share your thoughts based on the video and the figures.
#3. Based on the video and the figures above, is the US textile manufacturing sector a winner or loser of globalization and international trade? Why?
#4. Related to question #3, does the future prosperity of the US textile manufacturing sector need globalization or de-globalization? What’s your vision?
#5. Take the following poll (anonymous) and share your reflections.
#6. Should the government’s trade policy consider non-economic factors such as national security and geopolitics? What should be the line between promoting “fair trade” and “trade protectionism”? What’s your view?
#7. Is there anything else you find interesting/intriguing/thought-provoking in the video? Why?
(Welcome to our online discussion. For students in FASH455, please address at least two questions and mention the question number (#) in your reply)
Apparel is a $2.5 trillion global business, involving over 120 million workers worldwide and playing a uniquely critical role in the post-COVID economic recovery. The session intends to facilitate constructive dialogue regarding the progress, challenges, and opportunities of building a more resilient and sustainable fashion apparel supply chain in the Post-COVID world, which matters significantly to ALL stakeholders, from fashion brands, garment workers, and policymakers to ordinary consumers. The session will explore: 1) Why does building a more resilient and sustainable fashion apparel supply chain matter in the post-COVID world? What role can trade and trade policy play? 2) What significant progress has made the apparel supply chain more resilient and sustainable? What key challenges remain and why? 3) What needs to be done further to make the apparel supply chain more resilient and sustainable, particularly in the post-COVID world?
Panelists:
Dr. Arianna Rossi, Senior Research and Policy Specialist, International Labour Organization (ILO)
Ralph Kamphöner, Head of EU Office, Confederation of the German Textile and Fashion Industry
Dr. Sheng Lu, Associate Professor of Fashion and Apparel Studies, University of Delaware
Kekeli Ahiable, Advisor, Tony Blair Institute
Laura Husband, Just Style, Managing Editor (Moderator)
About the 2022 World Trade Organization (WTO) Public Forum
The 2022 WTO Public Forum, held from Sep 27 to 30, in Geneva, Switzerland) looked at how trade can contribute to post-pandemic economic recovery. The Forum examined, in particular, how trade rules can be strengthened, and government policies improved to create a more resilient, sustainable, and inclusive trading system. The Forum included three subthemes: Leveraging technology for an inclusive recovery, Delivering a trade agenda for a sustainable future, Framing the future of trade.
This study offers valuable input and practical policy recommendations from U.S. apparel companies’ perspectives regarding expanding U.S. apparel sourcing from CAFTA-DR members. For the study, we consulted executives at 27 leading U.S.-based apparel companies (note: 85% report having annual revenues exceeding $500 million; over 95% have been sourcing apparel from the CAFTA-DR region for more than ten years).
The results confirm that expanding U.S. apparel sourcing from CAFTA-DR could be the best chance to effectively create more jobs in Central America and solve the root causes of migration there. To achieve this goal, we need to focus on four areas:
First, improve CAFTA-DR’s apparel production capacity and diversify its product offers.
As many as 92 percent of respondents report currently sourcing apparel from CAFTA-DR members.
Highly consistent with the macro trade statistics, the vast majority of respondents (i.e., 60 percent) place less than 10 percent of their company’s total sourcing orders with CAFTA-DR members.
Whereas respondents rate CAFTA-DR members overall competitive in terms of “speed to market,” they express concerns about CAFTA-DR countries’ limited production capacity in making various products. As a result, U.S. companies primarily source basic fashion items like T-shirts and sweaters from the region. These products also face growing price competition with many alternative sourcing destinations.
Improving CAFTA-DR’s production capacity and diversifying product offers would encourage U.S. apparel companies to move more sourcing orders from Asia to the region permanently.
Second, practically solve the bottleneck of limited textile raw material supply within CAFTA-DR and do NOT worsen the problem.
The limited textile raw material supply within CAFTA-DR is a primary contributing factor behind the region’s stagnated apparel export volume and a lack of product diversification.
Notably, respondents say for their apparel imports from CAFTA-DR members, only 42.9% of fabrics, 40.0% of sewing threads, and 23.8% of accessories (such as trims and labels) can be sourced from within the CAFTA-DR area (including the United States). CAFTA-DR’s textile raw material supply problem could worsen as the U.S. textile industry switches to making more technical textiles and less so for apparel-related fabrics and textile accessories.
Maintaining the status quo or simply calling for making the CAFTA-DR apparel supply chain more “vertical” will NOT automatically increase the sourcing volume. Instead, allowing CAFTA-DR garment producers to access needed textile raw materials at a competitive price will be essential to encourage more U.S. apparel sourcing from the region.
Third, encourage more utilization of CAFTA-DR for apparel sourcing.
CAFTA-DR plays a critical role in promoting U.S. apparel sourcing from the region. Nearly 90 percent of respondents say the duty-free benefits provided by CAFTA-DR encourage their apparel sourcing from the region.
The limited textile supply within CAFTA-DR, especially fabrics and textile accessories, often makes it impossible for U.S. companies to source apparel from the region while fully complying with the strict “yarn-forward” rules of origin. As a result, consistent with the official trade statistics, around 31 percent of respondents say they sometimes have to forgo the CAFTA-DR duty-free benefits when sourcing from the region.
Respondents say the exceptions to the “yarn-forward” rules of origin, including “short supply,” “cumulation,” and “cut and assemble” rules, provide necessary flexibilities supporting respondents’ apparel sourcing from CAFTA-DR members. Around one-third of respondents utilize at least one of these three exceptions when sourcing from CAFTA-DR members when the products are short of meeting the strict “yarn-forward” rules of origin. It is misleading to call these exceptions “loopholes.”
Fourth, leverage expanded apparel sourcing to incentivize more investments in the CAFTA-DR region’s production and infrastructure.
U.S. apparel companies are interested in investing in CAFTA-DR to strengthen the region’s sourcing and production capacity. Nearly half of respondents explicitly say they will make investments, including “building factories or expanding sourcing or manufacturing capacities” in the CAFTA-DR region through 2026.
CAFTA-DR will be better positioned to attract long-term investments in its textile and apparel industry with a sound and expanded apparel sourcing volume.
U.S. fashion companies report significant challenges coming from the macro-economy in 2022, particularly inflation and rising cost pressures. However, most respondents still feel optimistic about the next five years.
Respondents rated “increasing production or sourcing costs” and “inflation and outlook of the U.S. economy” as their 1st and 3rd top business challenges in 2022.
As a new record, 100 percent of respondents expect their sourcing costs to increase in 2022, including nearly 40 percent expecting a substantial cost increase from a year ago. Further, almost everything has become more expensive this year, from textile raw materials, shipping, and labor to the costs associated with compliance with trade regulations.
Over 90 percent of respondents expect their sourcing value or volume to grow in 2022, but more modest than last year.
Despite the short-term challenges, most respondents (77 percent) feel optimistic or somewhat optimistic about the next five years. Reflecting companies’ confidence in their businesses, nearly ALL respondents (97 percent) plan to increase hiring over the next five years.
U.S. fashion companies adopt a more diverse sourcing base in response to supply chain disruptions and the need to mitigate growing sourcing risks.
Asia remains the dominant sourcing base for U.S. fashion companies—eight of the top ten most utilized sourcing destinations are Asia-based, led by China, Vietnam, Bangladesh, and India.
More than half of respondents (53 percent) report sourcing apparel from over ten countries in 2022, compared with only 37 percent in 2021.
Reducing “China exposure” is one crucial driver of U.S. fashion companies’ sourcing diversification strategy. One-third of respondents report sourcing less than 10% of their apparel products from China this year. In addition, a new record of 50 percent of respondents sources MORE from Vietnam than China in 2022.
Nearly 40 percent of respondents plan to “source from more countries and work with more suppliers” over the next two years, up from only 17 percent last year.
Managing the risk of forced labor in the supply chain is a top priority for U.S. fashion companies in 2022, especially with the new implementation of the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA).
Over 95 percent of respondents expect UFLPA’s implementation to affect their company’s sourcing. Notably, more than 85 percent of respondents plan to cut their cotton-apparel imports from China, and another 45 percent to further reduce non-cotton apparel imports from the country.
Most respondents (over 92 percent) do NOT plan to reduce apparel sourcing from Asian countries other than China. However, nearly 60 percent of respondents also would “explore new sourcing destinations outside Asia” in response to UFLPA.
Mapping and understanding the supply chain is a critical strategy adopted by U.S. fashion companies to address the forced labor risks in the supply chain. Almost all respondents currently track Tier 1 and 2 suppliers. With the help of new traceability technologies, 53 percent of respondents have started tracking Tier 3 suppliers this year (i.e., those manufacturing yarn, threads, and trimmings), a substantial increase from 25-36 percent in the past.
There is considerable new excitement about increasing apparel sourcing from members of the Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR). Respondents also call for more textile raw sourcing flexibility to encourage apparel sourcing from the CAFTA-DR region.
CAFTA-DR plays a more significant role as a sourcing base. About 20 percent of respondents place more than 10% of their sourcing orders from the region, doubling from 2021.
Over the next two years, more than 60 percent of respondents plan to increase apparel sourcing from CAFTA-DR members as part of their sourcing diversification strategy.
CAFTA-DR is critical in promoting U.S. apparel sourcing from the region. Around 80 percent of respondents took advantage of the agreement’s duty-free benefits when sourcing apparel from the region this year, up from 50—60 percent in the past.
Respondents say the exceptions to the “yarn-forward” rules of origin, such as the “short supply” and “cumulation” mechanisms, provide essential flexibility that encourages more apparel sourcing from CAFTA-DR members.
Respondents say improving textile raw material supply is critical to encouraging more U.S. apparel sourcing from CAFTA-DR members. Particularly, “allowing more flexibility in souring fabrics from outside CAFTA-DR” and “improving yarn production capacity and variety within CAFTA-DR” are the top two priorities.
U.S. fashion companies strongly support another ten-year renewal of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). Meanwhile, Ethiopia’s loss of AGOA eligibility discourages U.S. apparel sourcing from the ENTIRE AGOA region.
As much as 75 percent of respondents say another ten-year AGOA renewal will encourage more apparel sourcing from the region and making investment commitments.
However, despite the tariff benefits and the liberal rules of origin, respondents express explicit concerns about the region’s lack of competitiveness in speed to market, political instability, and having an integrated regional supply chain.
Ethiopia’s loss of AGOA benefits had a notable negative impact on sourcing from the country AND the entire AGOA region. Notably, no respondent plans to move sourcing orders from Ethiopia to other AGOA beneficiaries.
Congress might assess the U.S. experience with the Phase One process as it debates the merits of the deal and how to leverage it, the effects of the tariffs, and options to advance U.S. economic interests and counter China’s persistent statist economic practices. Specifically:
In light of how difficult it was to secure China’s acknowledgment of its practices of concern and limited commitments in these areas, to what extent may the U.S. reasonably expect talks with Beijing to achieve outcomes that further U.S. policy objectives, when measured against the U.S. resources and efforts required? Does focusing on talks with China take U.S. focus and resources away from efforts to deploy or develop U.S. trade tools and joint approaches with other countries that might be required to protect and advance U.S. economic interests?
Is the executive branch fully using its authorities to address its concerns about China? Are other approaches and measures needed in addition to or separate from tariffs, and if so, what are they? Should the USTR use Section 301 to address other concerns, such as subsidies? What approaches could be pursued, such as prior efforts with Europe and Japan to address non-market economic distortions and subsidies?
Should Congress require the USTR to enforce the Phase One provisions and actively use the Phase One dispute process? Should the USTR challenge China’s industrial policies that appear to violate commitments not to require technology transfer, and its efforts to set global technology licensing and pricing terms, such as through its courts?
How might Congress weigh the tariffs’ effects on U.S. firms and consumers against issues of economic competitiveness? To what extent are tariffs inflationary compared to drivers such as food, energy, housing, labor and supply chain shortages, and monetary policy?
Could tariffs help diversify China-based supply chains and counter China’s subsidies by raising costs vis-à-vis U.S. and third-market products? Could tariffs on goods tied to China’s industrial policies help level the playing field, or would this violate U.S. trade commitments and encourage others to follow suit? USTR proposed but never enacted tariffs on consumer electronics. Could these tariffs counter China’s efforts to deepen technology supply chains in China?
Congress could engage with the Administration to develop and implement guidelines for when and how to grant and extend exclusions. This could potentially promote transparency, consistency, and proper application of standards in reviewing requests, thereby helping to ensure that the USTR carries out Section 301 objectives as prescribed by Congress
What role should Congress play in the negotiation and consideration of an IPEF and other regional trade initiatives? What regional and other multilateral trade commitments would best serve U.S. economic and strategic interests in the region?
What types of enforcement mechanisms would an IPEF include and how would its commitments and enforceability compare to CPTPP and U.S. free trade agreements? What are the tradeoffs of these approaches and should they be pursued in tandem?
How does the expiration of U.S. Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) affect the Administration’s approach to scoping, negotiating, and enacting an IPEF and trade agreements?
AGOA reauthorization. AGOA is authorized through September 2025. US Trade Representative Katherine Tai has urged consideration of improvements to encourage investment, and help small and women-owned businesses and more countries make use of the program. Congress may consider whether and when to reauthorize AGOA and if reforms are needed.
Free trade agreement (FTA) negotiations. An FTA with an AGOA-eligible country would have implications for AGOA and U.S. trade relations in the region. As the Administration, in consultation with Congress, determines whether to pursue trade negotiations in the region, including with Kenya, key considerations include: (1) what flexibilities from typical U.S. FTA commitments are appropriate; (2) potential effects on broader AGOA utilization; and (3) potential effects on regional initiatives like the African Continental Free Trade Area(AfCFTA).
Increased U.S. tariffs. The Trump administration imposed tariff increases (Section 232) on steel and aluminum imports. Congress may examine the tariffs’ effects on AGOA participants.
Third-party agreements. Reciprocal agreements between AGOA beneficiaries and third parties (e.g., EU-South Africa) may disadvantage U.S. exporters. Congress may examine possible U.S. responses.
Congress may consider and advise the Administration on how to prioritize free trade agreement (FTA) talks with Kenya among other U.S. trade policy objectives; whether and in what form to seek renewal of the Trade Promotion Authority (TPA); the scope and extent of potential U.S.-Kenya FTA commitments to pursue; how to ensure an FTA with Kenya and its rules of origin support regional integration efforts and U.S. economic interests; and the potential types of support (e.g., trade capacity building funds) and flexibilities (e.g., phasing in of commitments) to include as appropriate to Kenya’s level of development)
Congress may continue to monitor U.S. trade and economic interests at stake in the UK-EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA)’s implementation. It may consider whether to press the Administration to continue to prioritize resolving specific trade issues and/or renew broader U.S-UK free trade agreement negotiations. In doing so, Congress may examine the potential benefits and costs of further U.S.-UK trade liberalization (or its absence) for the firms and workers in their districts and states.
Many in Congress and in the U.S. industry support a U.S.-UK FTA. Many Members tie their support to ensuring that Brexit outcomes do not undermine the Northern Ireland peace process. A potential TPA renewal debate could heighten these issues. If FTA talks proceed, Congress may monitor and shape them, and consider implementing legislation for a final agreement. Additionally, Members may examine other ways to engage further on bilateral and global trade issues of shared concern, e.g., sectoral regulatory cooperation or dialogues.
The GSP program expired on December 31, 2020. Congress is considering several bills to reauthorize and introduce new eligibility criteria to the program. Some of the proposed eligibility criteria include provisions on human rights, environmental laws, and good governance. Supporters of the proposed eligibility criteria consider it a modernization of the GSP program to address modern-day issues. Others raise concerns that adding new criteria may make the costs of complying with the program outweigh the benefits and discourage beneficiary developing countries’ participation. They may also undermine the core objectives of the program, which is to promote economic development through trade.
Other possible options for GSP include:
Support reciprocal tariff and market access benefit through free trade agreements (FTAs). Some U.S. policymakers have suggested that developing countries might benefit more through WTO multilateral negotiations, FTAs, or some form of agreement that could also provide reciprocal trade benefits and improved market access for the United States.
Authorize GSP only for Least-Developed Countries (LDCs). Narrowing the scope of eligibility could benefit the LDC that remains in the program by reducing competition in the U.S. market from more advanced developing countries. Assuming that many LDCs would continue to receive the GSP preference under AGOA, other LDCs that might benefit from an LDC-only GSP program are Afghanistan, Bhutan, Burma, Burundi, Cambodia, Congo (Kinshasa), Haiti, Kiribati, Mauritania, Nepal, Samoa, Somalia, South Sudan, the Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste,Tuvalu, and Vanuat.
Expand the application of GSP. For example, allow some import-sensitive products to receive preferential access (such as apparel). Increase the flexibility of rules of origin (ROO) requirements. For example, allow more GSP beneficiaries to cumulate inputs with other beneficiaries to meet the 35% domestic content requirement or lower the domestic content requirement. Eliminate competitive need limitations or raise the thresholds. Reauthorize GSP for longer terms or make the program permanent.
Restrict Application of Preferences. For example: Consider mandatory graduation for “middle income.” Strengthen provision that allows graduation of individual industry sectors within beneficiary countries. Reform eligibility criteria to strengthen provisions on worker rights as well as introduce new criteria, such as good governance, gender equality, and environmental law and regulation.
Congress may examine and weigh in on the TTC’s structure, priorities and scope, and prospects for “success.”
TTC’s anticipated prioritization of more recent or urgent issues (such as joint responses to Russia’s aggression in Ukraine), compared to other bilateral trade and technology issues (such as digital inclusion) that were priorities at the time of the TTC launch. Congress may explore potential trade-offs in priorities and/or opportunities to expand the TTC, such as by creating additional working groups or structures to sustain intensified cooperation on major bilateral trade issues. This may include a review of whether to modify the scope of the TTC’s working groups to address bilateral tariffs and other market access issues. Congress also may explore opportunities through the TTC to intensify U.S.-EU cooperation to remove regulatory barriers.
Congress may examine the TTC’s prospects for success and its ability to produce concrete outcomes, and also seek to establish the metrics by which to gauge the TTC’s effectiveness.
Congress may examine whether to pursue potential market opening opportunities through the TTC for future formal US-EU FTA talks, or pursue such talks separately. On one hand, potential FTA negotiations that develop out of the TTC could benefit from the intensified cooperation and renewed trust that the TTC may foster. On the other hand, such talks may be limited if they do not address bilateral tariffs or other market access issues.
In April 2022, the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) released its 2023 Fiscal Year Budget report, outlining five goals and objectives for 2023. Notably, textile and apparel is a key sector USTR plans to focus on in the coming year:
Goal 1: Open Foreign Markets and Combat Unfair Trade
Provide policy guidance and support for international negotiations or initiatives affecting the textile and apparel sector to ensure that the interests of U.S. industry and workers are taken into account and, where possible, to provide new or enhanced export opportunities for U.S. industry.
Conduct reviews of commercial availability petitions regarding textile and apparel products and negotiate corresponding FTA rules of origin changes, where appropriate, in a manner that takes into account market conditions while preserving export opportunities for U.S. producers and employment opportunities for U.S. workers.
Engage relevant trade partners to address regulatory issues potentially affecting the U.S. textile and apparel industry’s market access opportunities.
Continue to engage under CAFTA-DR working groups and committees to optimize inclusive economic opportunities; strengthen the agreement and address non-tariff trade impediments; provide capacity building in textile and apparel trade-related regulation and practice on customs, border and market access issues, including agriculture and sanitary and phytosanitary regulation, to avoid barriers to trade.
Continue to engage CAFTA-DR partners and stakeholders to identify and develop means to increase two-way trade in textiles and apparel and strengthen the North American supply chain to enhance formal job creation.
Goal 2: Fully Enforce U.S. Trade Laws, Monitor Compliance with Agreements, and Use All Available Tools to Hold Other Countries Accountable
Closely collaborate with industry and other offices and Departments to monitor trade actions taken by partner countries on textiles and apparel to ensure that such actions are consistent with trade agreement obligations and do not impede U.S. export opportunities.
Research and monitor policy support measures for the textile sector, in particular in China, India, and other large textile producing and exporting countries, to ensure compliance with international agreements.
Continue to work with the U.S. textile and apparel industry to promote exports and other opportunities under our free trade agreements and preference programs, by actively engaging with stakeholders and industry associations and participating, as appropriate, in industry trade shows.
Goal 4: Develop Equitable Trade Policy Through Inclusive Processes
Take the lead in providing policy advice and assistance in support of any Congressional initiatives to reform or re-examine preference programs that have an impact on the textile and apparel sector.
The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)is a free trade agreement between ten member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)* and five other large economies in the Asia-Pacific region (China, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, and Australia). RCEP was reached on November 15, 2020, after nearly eight years of tough negotiation. (Note: ASEAN members include Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. India was an original RCEP member but decided to quit in late 2019 due to concerns about competing with Chinese products, including textiles and apparel.)
So far, RCEP is the world’s largest trading bloc. As of 2019, RCEP members accounted for nearly 26.2% of world GDP, 29.5% of world merchandise exports, and 25.9% of world merchandise imports.
As of November 1, 2021, Lao, Burnei, Cambodia, Singapore and Thailand (ASEAN members), as well as China, Japan, New Zealand and Australia have ratified the agreement. This has met the minimum criteria for RCEP to enter into force (i.e., six members, including at least three ASEAN members and three non-ASEAN members).
Why RCEP matters to the textile and apparel industry?
RCEP matters significantly for the textile and apparel (T&A) sector. According to statistics from the United Nations, in 2019, the fifteen RCEP members altogether exported US$374 billion worth of T&A (or 50% of the world share) and imported US$139 billion (or 20% of the world share).
In particular, RCEP members serve as critical apparel-sourcing bases for many US and EU fashion brands. For example, in 2019, close to 60% of US apparel imports came from RCEP members, up from 45% in 2005. Likewise, in 2019, 32% of EU apparel imports also came from RCEP members, up from 28.1% in 2005.
Notably, RCEP members have been developing and forming a regional textile and apparel supply chain. More economically advanced RCEP members (such as Japan, South Korea, and China) supply textile raw materials to the less economically developed countries in the region within this regional supply chain. Based on relatively lower wages, the less developed countries typically undertake the most labor-intensive processes of apparel manufacturing and then export finished apparel to major consumption markets worldwide.
As a reflection of an ever more integrated regional supply chain, in 2019, as much as 72.8% of RCEP members’ textile imports came from other RCEP members, a substantial increase from only 57.6% in 2005. Nearly 40% of RCEP members’ textile exports also went to other RCEP members in 2019, up from 31.9% in 2005.
What are the key provisions in RCEP related to textiles and apparel?
First, RCEP members have committed to reducing the tariff rates to zero for most textile and apparel traded between RCEP members on day one after the agreement enters into force. That being said, the detailed tariff phaseout schedule for textile and apparel products under RCEP is very complicated. Each RCEP member sets their own tariff phaseout schedule, which can last more than 20 years (for example, 34 years for South Korea and 21 years for Japan.) Also, different from U.S. or EU-based free trade agreements, the RCEP phaseout schedule is country-specific. For example, South Korea sets different tariff phaseout schedules for textile and apparel products from ASEAN, China, Australia, Japan, and New Zealand. Japan’s tariff cut for apparel products is more generous toward ASEAN members and less so for China and South Korea (see the graph above). Companies interested in taking advantage of the duty-free benefits under RCEP need to study the “rules of the game” in detail.
Second, in general, RCEP adopts very liberal rules of origin for apparel products. It only requires that all non-originating materials used in the production of the good have undergone a tariff shift at the 2-digit HS code level (say a change from any chapters from chapters 50-60 to chapter 61). In other words, RCEP members are allowed to source yarns and fabrics from anywhere in the world, and the finished garments will still qualify for duty-free benefits. Most garment factories in RCEP member countries can immediately enjoy the RCEP benefits without adjusting their current supply chains.
What are the potential economic impacts of RCEP on the textile and apparel sector?
On the one hand, the implementation of RCEP is likely to further strengthen the regional textile and apparel supply chain among RCEP members. Particularly, RCEP will likely strengthen Japan, South Korea, and China as the primary textile suppliers for the regional T&A supply chain. Meanwhile, RCEP will also enlarge the role of ASEAN as the leading apparel producer in the region.
On the other hand, as a trading bloc, RCEP could make it even harder for non-RCEP members to get involved in the regional textile and apparel supply chain formed by RCEP members. Because an entire regional textile and apparel supply chain already exists among RCEP members, plus the factor of speed to market, few incentives are out there for RCEP members to partner with suppliers from outside the region in textile and apparel production. The tariff elimination under the RCEP will put textile and apparel producers that are not members of the agreement at a more significant disadvantage in the competition. Not surprisingly, according to a recent study, measured by value, only around 21.5% of RCEP members’ textile imports will come from outside the area after the implementation of the agreement, down from the base-year level of 29.9% in 2015.
Further, the reaching of RCEP could accelerate the negotiation of other trade agreements in the Asia-Pacific region, such as the China-South Korea-Japan Free Trade Agreement. We might also see growing pressures on the Biden administration to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) to strengthen the US economic ties with countries in the Asia-Pacific region. The economic competition between the United States and China in the area could also intensify as the combined effects of RCEP and CPTPP begin to shape new supply chains and test the impacts of the two countries on the regional trade patterns.
#1 In class, we discussed that trade always creates both winners and losers. So who are the winners and losers in the US-China tariff war? Also, why should or should not the government use trade policy to pick up winners and losers in international trade?
#2 Why do you think U.S. fashion brands and retailers oppose Section 301 tariffs on apparel imports from China, whereas the National Council of Textile Organizations (NCTO), which represents the US textile industry, supports Trump’s tariff action?
#3 The U.S.-China tariff war continues during the pandemic, resulting in higher sourcing costs for U.S. fashion brands and retailers, which have been struggling hard financially. In such a case, if you were the CEO of Macy’s, why or why not would you pass the tariff burden to consumers, i.e., ask consumers to pay a higher price?
#4 Why or why not do you agree with the Trump Administration to lift the Section 301 tariffs on PPE imports from China? Isn’t a high tariff typically protects the domestic industry and would incentivize more U.S.-based PPE production?
#5 Most classic trade theories (such as the comparative advantage trade theory and the factor proportion trade theory) advocate free trade with no government interventions. However, international trade in the real world has been so heavily influenced by government policy, such as tariffs. How to explain this phenomenon? Are trade theories wrong, or is the government wrong?
[Anyone is welcome to join the online discussion. For students in FASH455, please address at least two questions in your comment. Please also mention the question number in your comment]
The original interview (in Spanish) is available HERE. Below is the translated version.
Question: Is there a reversal in the globalization of fashion?
Sheng Lu: The fashion industry is becoming more global AND regional — the making and selling of a garment “travel” through more and more countries. Just look at the label of a Gap sweatshirt: it is an American clothing brand, but the product is “Made in Vietnam,” and the label includes the size standards in six different countries. The business model of the fashion industry today is “making anywhere in the world and selling anywhere in the world.”
Q .: What do you mean the industry is becoming more “regional”?
Sheng Lu: The trade flows of textiles and apparel today are heavily influenced by regional free trade agreements (FTAs). For example, while China is known as the world’s largest apparel producer and exporter, nearly 50% of the clothing consumed by European consumers are still produced by EU countries themselves. Notably, consumers have different expectations for clothing: many are price-sensitive, but others prefer more trendy items, which requires “near sourcing”—this explains why fashion companies have to adopt a more balanced sourcing portfolio.
Q .: Is the price still the most important factor in fashion companies’ sourcing decisions?
Sheng Lu: Sourcing is far more than just about chasing for the lowest cost. Sourcing decisions today have to consider a mix of factors, ranging from flexibility, speed to market, sustainability, to compliance risks. In fact, few companies “put all eggs in one basket.” My recent studies show that both in the United States and the EU, fashion companies with more than 1,000 employees, typically sourced from more than twenty different countries—sometimes even exceed forty. Behind such a diversified sourcing practice is the necessity to strike a balance between so many different sourcing factors.
Q .: Is apparel sourcing becoming more diversified today than a decade ago?
Sheng Lu: From my observations, fashion companies are souring from more countries and regions than a decade ago, but not in terms of producers. Especially in the last two or three years, I see some large companies are consolidating their supplier base to build a closer relationship with key vendors. The reason is the same as mentioned earlier: a very competitive price is not enough for apparel sourcing today.
Q .: How has the tariff war between the United States and China affected apparel sourcing?
Sheng Lu: The trade war between the United States and China is having big impacts on apparel sourcing that go beyond the two countries. Notably, American fashion brands and retailers are moving sourcing orders from China to other Asian countries such as Vietnam and Bangladesh. However, finding China’s alternatives is anything but easy. Despite the tariff war, China remains a competitive player in apparel sourcing. The unparalleled production capacity that can fulfill orders nearly for any products in any quantity, and the ability to comply with complex sustainability and social responsibility regulations are among China’s unique competitive advantages. Understandably, companies are not giving up sourcing from China, as there are few other “balanced” sourcing destinations in the world. That being said, it is important to recognize that the big landscape of apparel sourcing is evolving. Even in Europe, which is not having a trade war with China, apparel “Made in China” is seeing a notable decline in its market share.
Q .: How is China adapting?
Sheng Lu: The textile and apparel industry in China is undergoing a structural change. Partially caused by the tariff war, apparel producers in China are increasingly moving their factories to nearby Asian countries (especially for big-volume and/or relatively low value-added product categories). Meanwhile, China itself is changing from an apparel producer to become a leading textile supplier for other apparel-exporting countries in Asia. This is NOT a temporary move, but a permanent transition, which has happened in many industrialized economies in history. Somehow, the tariff war has accelerated the adjustment process, however.
Q .: Will Africa be the next hub for apparel sourcing in the near future?
Sheng Lu: As textile and clothing trade is turning more regional-based, Africa is facing significant challenges to become an attractive tier-1 sourcing base for Western fashion brands and apparel retailers.
Q .: Why is that?
Sheng Lu: In general, there are three primary apparel import markets in the world: the United States, the European Union, and Japan—as of 2018, these three regions altogether still accounted for as many as 70% of the world apparel imports. Surely, Asian countries are important apparel suppliers for all these three regions. However, each of these three markets also has its respective regional suppliers—Mexico and Central & South American countries for the United States, China, and a few Southeast Asian countries for Japan and Eastern European countries for the EU market. Other than geographic proximity, often, these regional suppliers also enjoy preferential market access to the US, EU, and Japan provided by regional free trade agreements.
Africa, on the other hand, is not close to any of these three major apparel import markets geographically. Why would fashion companies in the United States, Japan, or the EU have to source from Africa when there are so many other options available?
Q .: For price?
Sheng Lu: Several trade preference programs currently offer apparel exporters in African countries preferential or duty-free market access to the United States, the EU, and Japan (such as the African Growth Opportunity Act and the EU and Japan Generalized System of Preferences programs). However, sourcing from Africa will entail other extra costs—for example, the raw material cost will be higher as yarns and fabrics have to be imported from Asia first, and the transportation bill could be costly due to the poor infrastructure. Further, not like their counterpart in Asia, the apparel industry is not regarded as a development priority in many African countries, which continue to rely heavily on the export of raw materials instead. Manufacturing for the local market is also complicated—apparel producers in Africa are struggling with both the cheap clothing imported from Asia and the mounting used clothing sent from the West.
Q .: It is said that fashion might be the most regulated sector in international trade other than agriculture. How to explain this?
Sheng Lu: I think we need some changes here. For example, in 2018, textiles and apparel accounted for only 5% of the total U.S. merchandise imports but contributed nearly 40% of the tariff revenue collected. This phenomenon, which makes no sense economically, is the result of the industry lobby—trying to protect domestic manufacturers from import competition.
As another example, around 15%-17% of Mexico’s clothing exports to the United States do not claim the duty-free benefits provided by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), as the NAFTA rules of origin strictly require the using of regional yarns and fabrics for qualified apparel items. In the end, companies prefer bigger savings on the raw material cost than claiming the NAFTA duty-saving benefits. We should think about how to modernize these trade rules and make them more supply-chain friendly in the 21st century.
Meanwhile, policymakers are developing new regulations to address some emerging areas in international trade, such as E-commerce, labor standards and environmental protection. Increasingly, trade policy is moving from “measures at the border” to “measures behind the borders.”
A group of eminent panelists will bring their experience on how digital technologies are changing international trade and how international trade cooperation can help governments reap the benefits and address the challenges of digital trade.
Speakers/Panalists:
Roberto Azevêdo, Director-General, World Trade Organization
1: What do you see as the biggest challenges – and opportunities – facing the apparel industry in 2019, and why?
In my view, uncertainty will remain the single biggest challenge facing the apparel industry in 2019, ranging from a more volatile global economy, the unpredictable outlook of the U.S.-China trade talks to the various possible scenarios of Brexit. While uncertainty creates exciting new research opportunities for scholars like me, it could be a big headache for companies seeking a foreseeable market environment to guide their future business plan and investments.
Meanwhile, the increasing digitalization of the apparel supply chain based on big-data tools and artificial intelligence (AI) technologies means a huge opportunity for fashion companies. Indeed, the apparel industry is quickly changing in nature—becoming ever more globalized, supply-chain based, technology-intensive and data-driven. Take talent recruitment as an example. In the 2018 US Fashion Industry Benchmarking Study, which I conducted in collaboration with the US Fashion Industry Association (USFIA), as much as 68 percent of surveyed leading U.S. fashion brands and apparel retailers say they plan to increase hiring of data scientists in the next five years. Googling “apparel industry” together with terms such as “big data” and “data science” also returns much more results than in the past. It is hopeful that the advancement of digital technologies and the smarter use of data will enable apparel companies to overcome market uncertainties better and improve many aspects of their businesses such as speed to market, operational efficiency and even sustainability.
2: What’s happening with sourcing? How is the sourcing landscape likely to shift in 2019, and what can apparel firms and their suppliers do to stay ahead?
Based on my research, I have three observations regarding apparel companies’ sourcing trends and the overall sourcing landscape in 2019:
First, apparel companies overall will continue to maintain a diverse sourcing base. For example, in a recent study, we examined the detailed sourcing portfolios of the 50 largest U.S.-based apparel companies ranked by the Apparel Magazine. Notably, on average these companies sourced from over 20 different countries or regions using more than 200 vendors in 2017. Similarly, in the 2018 US Fashion Industry Benchmarking Study, which I conducted in collaboration with the US Fashion Industry Association (USFIA), we also found companies with more than 1,000 employees typically source from more than ten different countries and regions. Since no sourcing destination is perfect, maintaining a relatively diverse sourcing base allows apparel companies to strike a balance among various sourcing factors ranging from cost, speed, flexibility, to risk management.
Second, while apparel companies are actively seeking new sourcing bases, many of them are reducing either the number of countries they source from or the number of vendors they work with. According to our study, some apparel companies have been strategically reducing the number of sourcing facilities with the purpose of ensuring closer collaborations with their suppliers on social and environmental compliance issues. Some other companies are consolidating their sourcing base within certain regions to improve efficiency and maximize productivity in the supply chain. Related to this trend, it is interesting to note that approximately half of the 50 largest U.S. apparel companies report allocating more sourcing orders to their largest vendor in 2017 than three years ago.
Third, nearshoring or onshoring will become more visible. Take “Made in the USA” apparel for example. According to the 2018 U.S. Fashion Industry Benchmarking Study, around 46 percent of surveyed U.S. fashion brands and apparel retailers report currently sourcing “Made in the USA” products, even though local sourcing typically only account for less than 10 percent of these companies’ total sourcing value or volume. In a recent study, we find that 94 out of the total 348 retailers (or 27 percent) sold “Made in the USA” apparel in the U.S. market between December 2017 and November 2018. These “Made in the USA” apparel items, in general, focus on fashion-oriented women’s wear, particularly in the categories of bottoms (such as skirts, jeans, and trousers), dresses, all-in-ones (such as playsuits and dungarees), swimwear and suits-sets. The advantage of proximity to the market, which makes speedy replenishment for in-season items possible, also allows retailers to price “Made in the USA” apparel substantially higher than imported ones and avoid offering deep discounts. Looking ahead, thanks to automation technology and consumers’ increasing demand for speed to market, I think nearshoring or onshoring, including ”Made in the USA” apparel, will continue to have its unique role to play in fashion brands and retailers’ merchandising and sourcing strategies.
3: What should apparel firms and their suppliers be doing now if they want to remain competitive further into the future? What will separate the winners from the losers?
2019 will be a year to test apparel companies’ resources, particularly in the sourcing area. For example, winners will be those companies that have built a sophisticated but nimble global sourcing network that can handle market uncertainties effectively. Likewise, companies that understand and leverage the evolving “rules of the game”, such as the apparel-specific rules of origin and tariff phase-out schedules of existing or newly-reached free trade agreements, will be able to control sourcing cost better and achieve higher profit margins. Given the heavy involvement of trade policy in apparel sourcing this year, companies with solid government relations should also enjoy unique competitive advantages.
On the other hand, as apparel business is changing in nature, to stay competitive, apparel companies need to start investing the future. This includes but not limited to exploring new sourcing destinations, studying the changing consumer demographics, recruiting new talents with expertise in emerging areas, and adopting new technologies fitting for the digital age.
4: What keeps you awake at night? Is there anything else you think the apparel industry should be keeping a close eye on in the year ahead? Do you expect 2019 to be better than 2018, and why?
Two things are at the top of my watchlist:
First, what is the future of China as an apparel sourcing base? While external factors such as the U.S.-China tariff war have attracted most of the public attention, the genuine evolution of China’s textile and apparel industry is something even more critical to watch in the long run. From my observation, China is playing an increasingly important role as a textile supplier for apparel-exporting countries in Asia. For example, measured by value, 47 percent of Bangladesh’s textile imports came from China in 2017, up from 39 percent in 2005. Similar trends are seen in Cambodia (up from 30 percent to 65 percent), Vietnam (up from 23 percent to 50 percent), Pakistan (up from 32 percent to 71 percent), Malaysia (up from 25 percent to 54 percent), Indonesia (up from 28 percent to 46 percent), Philippines (up from 19 percent to 41 percent) and Sri Lanka (up from 15 percent to 39 percent) over the same time frame. A key question in my mind is how quickly China’s textile and apparel industry will continue to evolve and upgrade by following the paths of most other advanced economies in history.
Second, how will the implementation of several newly-reached free trade agreements (FTAs) affect the big landscape of apparel sourcing and the existing regional apparel supply chains? For example:
The newly-reached U.S.-Mexico-Canada Free Trade Agreement (USMCA or commonly called NAFTA2.0) includes several interesting changes to the textile and apparel specific rules of origin provisions, such as the adjustment of the tariff-preference level (TPL) mechanism. Whether these changes will boost textile and apparel production in the Western-Hemisphere and attract more sourcing from the region will be something interesting to watch.
The implementation of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP)and the EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (EVFTA)will allow Vietnam to get access to nearly 40% of the world apparel import market (i.e., EU + Japan) duty-free. However, restrained by the country’s relatively small population, the apparel industry is increasingly facing the challenge of competing for labor with other export-oriented sectors in Vietnam. Realistically, what is the growth potential of apparel “Made in Vietnam” after the implementation of CPTPP and EVFTA?
In 2017, close to 80% of Asian countries’ textile imports came from other Asian countries, up from around 70% in the 2000s. Similarly, in 2017, 85.6% of Asian countries’ apparel imports also came from within the region. The negotiation of the Regional Comprehensive and Economic Partnership (RCEP) is likely to conclude in 2019, whose membership includes member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and other six economies in the Asia-Pacific region (Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand). Will RCEP result in an ever more integrated Asia-based textile and apparel supply chain and make the Asia region even more competitive as an apparel sourcing destination?
First, the world used
clothing trade has grown significantly over the past ten years. Statistics
from the United Nations show that the value of world used clothing trade (HS
code 630900) has quickly increased from $1.8bn in 2006 to $3.7bn in 2016, an
increase of 106 percent. Between 2006 and 2016, the value of world used
clothing trade enjoyed a 7.6 percent compound annual growth rate (CAGR), which
was almost double the pace of 3.4 percent CAGR for new clothing trade (HS
chapters 61 and 62) over the same period.
Second, the world
used clothing trade flow is highly unbalanced. On the one hand, the developed
economies are the dominant suppliers of used clothing to the world. In
2016, nearly 40 percent of the world’s used clothing exports came from three
countries alone: the United States (15 percent), the United Kingdom (13
percent) and Germany (11 percent). Data also shows that the European Union and
the United States together stably accounted for as much as 65 percent of the
value of world clothing exports between 2006 and 2016. The other country worth
mentioning is China, which is quickly becoming another leading used clothing
exporter in the world. In 2016, China’s used clothing exports totaled US$218m
from only US$0.32m in 2006, an increase of more than 684 percent!
On the other hand,
most of the world used clothing exports end up sold in the developing
countries, especially the least developed ones. For example, in 2016,
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) as a whole imported approximately 20 percent of the
world’s used clothing, far more than any other regions in the world. By value,
the top three individual importers of used clothing in 2016 are all developing
countries as well, namely Pakistan (6.0 percent), Malaysia (5.8 percent) and
Ukraine (4.9 percent).
Third, trade policies
regulating used clothing trade often raise controversies. While trade
barriers on new clothing attract much of the public attention, the used
clothing trade is facing even heavier and trickier restrictions of various
kinds. The World Trade Organization (WTO) data shows that in 2016 the average
applied tariff rate for used clothing imports was 19.3 percent, higher than
15.4 percent of new clothing (HS Chapters 61 and 62). Of the total 180
countries covered by the WTO tariff database, 115 (or 64 percent) set an equal
or higher tariff rate for used clothing than the new one. Further, it is not
rare to see extremely high import tariff rates and other quantitative
restrictions applied to used clothing trade. For example, in 2016 the applied
most-favored-nation (MFN) ad valorem equivalent tariff rate for used clothing
was as high as 356.9 percent in Uzbekistan, 167.3 percent in Zimbabwe, 149.2
percent in South Africa, 116.8 percent in Rwanda and 100 percent in Vietnam.
After all, because of
the complicated social, economic and political factors involved, how to
regulate and manage used clothing trade remains a key challenge facing the
world community.
FASH455 Global Apparel & Textile Trade and Sourcing 