#1 How do you think it would be possible for the United States to successfully re-shore apparel manufacturing when so many other countries have the advantage in speed, efficiency, and cost?
#2 The Berry Amendment is highly favored by NCTO and is seen as being good for the U.S textile industry and American pride. Why or why not do you think Berry Amendment should be applied to other segments of the fashion industry? Will such an initiative gain broad support?
#3 Why do you think NCTO suggests the trump administration impose tariffs on finished apparel items from China, whereas U.S. fashion brands and retailers oppose the tariff action strongly?
#4 Assume you are a sourcing manager for a major US fashion brand, how would you rank the following regarding importance when determining a sourcing destination: Speed to Market, Sourcing Cost, Flexibility and Agility, and Risk of Compliance? Why would you rank them as such?
#6 Why do you think U.S. fashion brands and apparel retailers are sticking with sourcing from China, when there are less expensive products in other countries, such as Bangladesh and Vietnam?
#7 According to the 2019 US fashion industry benchmarking study, some apparel retailers source from more than 10 or even 20 different countries or regions. What are the benefits of adopting such a diversified sourcing base? Is it necessary?
(Welcome to our online discussion. For students in FASH455, please address at least two questions and mention the question # in your reply)
U.S. fashion brands and retailers are deeply concerned about the negative impacts of the tariff war on their businesses. According to the 2019 U.S. Fashion Industry Benchmarking Study released by the U.S. Fashion Industry Association, even without considering the upcoming 10-15% tariffs to be imposed on around $35.7 billion Chinese textiles and apparel covered by tranche 4:
The trade diversion effect of Section 301 has accelerated U.S. fashion companies’ pace of reducing sourcing from China. About 83 percent of respondents expect to decrease sourcing from China over the next two years, up further from 67 percent in 2018.
The Section 301 action is pushing up the price of U.S. apparel imports across the board, making “increasing production and sourcing cost” the top business challenge for respondents in 2019. As much as 63 percent of respondents explicitly say the U.S. Section 301 tariff action against China “increased my companies’ sourcing cost” in 2019. As companies are moving sourcing orders to Bangladesh, Vietnam, and India, the average price of U.S. apparel imports from these countries – the main alternatives to China — have all gone up very quickly.
No evidence shows that Section 301 has benefited near-sourcing from the Western Hemisphere and reshoring from the United States significantly. Instead, respondents say Section 301 has increased the production costs of textiles and apparel “Made in the USA.”
Respondents say they are reluctant but may have to increase their retail prices, should the U.S.-China tariff war escalate further.
As described in the video, transshipment is one form of illegal import activities and occurs when false country-of-origin information is provided for imported goods in order to evade U.S. customs duties. Transshipment was a major issue in textile and apparel trade back in days when the quota system was still in place.
According to the media, because of the escalating U.S.-China tariff war, customs fraud such as transshipment is thriving again. Some fashion companies are also using tariff engineering to avoid paying the punitive tariffs in a legal way. Indeed, how to label “Made in ___” can be much more complicated, technical and subtle than we realize.
This article tries to evaluate the potential impact of the U.S.-China tariff war on the U.S. textile and apparel (T&A) industry, including manufacturing and related trade activities.
The quantitative evaluation conducted is based on the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model. Data came from the latest GTAP9 database, which covers trade, employment and production in 57 sectors in 140 countries. In correspondence to the recent development of the U.S.-China tariff war, the analysis focuses on the following three scenarios:
Scenario 1: 10% punitive tariff + base year tariff rate in 2017 applied to products traded between the U.S. and China, except textiles and apparel
Scenario 2: 10% punitive tariff + base year tariff rate in 2017 applied to products traded between the U.S. and China, including textiles and apparel
Scenario 3: 25% punitive tariff + base year tariff rate in 2017 applied to products traded between the U.S. and China, including textiles and apparel
Three findings are of note:
First, the tariff war with China will increase the market price for T&A in the United States and consequentially incentivize more production of T&A “Made in the USA.” As shown in Figure 1, the annual U.S. T&A production will increase when the punitive tariff is imposed on textile and apparel imports from China. The most significant increase will happen in scenario 3 (textile output expands by US$8,829 million and apparel output expands by US$6,044 million) when a 25 percent punitive tariff is imposed and the market price of T&A in the U.S. also correspondingly goes up by nearly 1.5% compared with the base year level in 2017.
Second, the tariff war with China will hurt U.S. textile exports. The results show that the tariff war will increase the production cost of “Made in the USA,” and result in a decline of U.S. textile exports due to reduced price competitiveness. This is the case even in scenario 1 when the tariff war does not target T&A directly, but nevertheless, raises the price of intermediaries for producing textiles in the United States. The results further show that the annual U.S. textile exports will suffer the most significant decline in scenario 3 (down US$1,136 million), especially to China and other Asian countries where U.S. textile products are facing intense competition from local suppliers. In comparison, U.S. textile exports to the Western Hemisphere will suffer a loss as well in the tariff war, but to a much less extent due to the strong supply-chain relationship with the region.
Third, the trade diversion effect of the tariff war will bring in more apparel imports to the U.S. market from Asian suppliers other than China. As shown in the figure above, when the punitive tariff imposed on textile and apparel products, the value of U.S. apparel imports from China will decline ranging from US$4,573 million (10 percent punitive tariff imposed) to US$8,858 million (25 percent punitive tariff imposed) annually compared with the base year level in 2017. This result reflects U.S. apparel importers and retailers’ mounting concerns about sourcing cost in the setting of the tariff war. However, apparently, the tariff war will do little to help U.S. domestic apparel manufacturers reduce the competitive pressure with imports. Particularly, in scenario 3, U.S. apparel imports from suppliers other than China will increase as much as US$10,400 million, worsening the U.S. trade deficit in the apparel sector further.