Summary of CRS Reports in 2022: Selected Key Trade Issues for US Congress

US-China Phase One Trade Deal

Congress might assess the U.S. experience with the Phase One process as it debates the merits of the deal and how to leverage it, the effects of the tariffs, and options to advance U.S. economic interests and counter China’s persistent statist economic practices. Specifically:

  • In light of how difficult it was to secure China’s acknowledgment of its practices of concern and limited commitments in these areas, to what extent may the U.S. reasonably expect talks with Beijing to achieve outcomes that further U.S. policy objectives, when measured against the U.S. resources and efforts required? Does focusing on talks with China take U.S. focus and resources away from efforts to deploy or develop U.S. trade tools and joint approaches with other countries that might be required to protect and advance U.S. economic interests?
  • Is the executive branch fully using its authorities to address its concerns about China? Are other approaches and measures needed in addition to or separate from tariffs, and if so, what are they? Should the USTR use Section 301 to address other concerns, such as subsidies? What approaches could be pursued, such as prior efforts with Europe and Japan to address non-market economic distortions and subsidies?
  • Should Congress require the USTR to enforce the Phase One provisions and actively use the Phase One dispute process? Should the USTR challenge China’s industrial policies that appear to violate commitments not to require technology transfer, and its efforts to set global technology licensing and pricing terms, such as through its courts?
  • How might Congress weigh the tariffs’ effects on U.S. firms and consumers against issues of economic competitiveness? To what extent are tariffs inflationary compared to drivers such as food, energy, housing, labor and supply chain shortages, and monetary policy?
  • Could tariffs help diversify China-based supply chains and counter China’s subsidies by raising costs vis-à-vis U.S. and third-market products? Could tariffs on goods tied to China’s industrial policies help level the playing field, or would this violate U.S. trade commitments and encourage others to follow suit? USTR proposed but never enacted tariffs on consumer electronics. Could these tariffs counter China’s efforts to deepen technology supply chains in China?

Section 301 Exclusions on US Imports from China

Congress could engage with the Administration to develop and implement guidelines for when and how to grant and extend exclusions. This could potentially promote transparency, consistency, and proper application of standards in reviewing requests, thereby helping to ensure that the USTR carries out Section 301 objectives as prescribed by Congress

Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF)

  • What role should Congress play in the negotiation and consideration of an IPEF and other regional trade initiatives? What regional and other multilateral trade commitments would best serve U.S. economic and strategic interests in the region?
  • What types of enforcement mechanisms would an IPEF include and how would its commitments and enforceability compare to CPTPP and U.S. free trade agreements? What are the tradeoffs of these approaches and should they be pursued in tandem?
  • How does the expiration of U.S. Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) affect the Administration’s approach to scoping, negotiating, and enacting an IPEF and trade agreements?

Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP)

  • What are the costs and benefits of different approaches to regional economic engagement (CPTPP, IPEF, RCEP)? Should other approaches be considered?
  • What scope exists for changes to CPTPP if the United States were to consider joining, and what are the implications of China’s potential membership?

African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA)

  • AGOA reauthorization. AGOA is authorized through September 2025. US Trade Representative Katherine Tai has urged consideration of improvements to encourage investment, and help small and women-owned businesses and more countries make use of the program. Congress may consider whether and when to reauthorize AGOA and if reforms are needed.
  • Free trade agreement (FTA) negotiations. An FTA with an AGOA-eligible country would have implications for AGOA and U.S. trade relations in the region. As the Administration, in consultation with Congress, determines whether to pursue trade negotiations in the region, including with Kenya, key considerations include: (1) what flexibilities from typical U.S. FTA commitments are appropriate; (2) potential effects on broader AGOA utilization; and (3) potential effects on regional initiatives like the African Continental Free Trade Area(AfCFTA).
  • Increased U.S. tariffs. The Trump administration imposed tariff increases (Section 232) on steel and aluminum imports. Congress may examine the tariffs’ effects on AGOA participants.
  • Third-party agreements. Reciprocal agreements between AGOA beneficiaries and third parties (e.g., EU-South Africa) may disadvantage U.S. exporters. Congress may examine possible U.S. responses.

US-Kenya Free Trade Agreement Negotiation

Congress may consider and advise the Administration on how to prioritize free trade agreement (FTA) talks with Kenya among other U.S. trade policy objectives; whether and in what form to seek renewal of the Trade Promotion Authority (TPA); the scope and extent of potential U.S.-Kenya FTA commitments to pursue; how to ensure an FTA with Kenya and its rules of origin support regional integration efforts and U.S. economic interests; and the potential types of support (e.g., trade capacity building funds) and flexibilities (e.g., phasing in of commitments) to include as appropriate to Kenya’s level of development)

U.S.-UK Trade Relations

Congress may continue to monitor U.S. trade and economic interests at stake in the UK-EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA)’s implementation. It may consider whether to press the Administration to continue to prioritize resolving specific trade issues and/or renew broader U.S-UK free trade agreement negotiations. In doing so, Congress may examine the potential benefits and costs of further U.S.-UK trade liberalization (or its absence) for the firms and workers in their districts and states.

Many in Congress and in the U.S. industry support a U.S.-UK FTA. Many Members tie their support to ensuring that Brexit outcomes do not undermine the Northern Ireland peace process. A potential TPA renewal debate could heighten these issues. If FTA talks proceed, Congress may monitor and shape them, and consider implementing legislation for a final agreement. Additionally, Members may examine other ways to engage further on bilateral and global trade issues of shared concern, e.g., sectoral regulatory cooperation or dialogues.

Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) Reauthorization and Reform

The GSP program expired on December 31, 2020. Congress is considering several bills to reauthorize and introduce new eligibility criteria to the program. Some of the proposed eligibility criteria include provisions on human rights, environmental laws, and good governance. Supporters of the proposed eligibility criteria consider it a modernization of the GSP program to address modern-day issues. Others raise concerns that adding new criteria may make the costs of complying with the program outweigh the benefits and discourage beneficiary developing countries’ participation. They may also undermine the core objectives of the program, which is to promote economic development through trade.

Other possible options for GSP include:

  • Support reciprocal tariff and market access benefit through free trade agreements (FTAs). Some U.S. policymakers have suggested that developing countries might benefit more through WTO multilateral negotiations, FTAs, or some form of agreement that could also provide reciprocal trade benefits and improved market access for the United States.
  • Authorize GSP only for Least-Developed Countries (LDCs). Narrowing the scope of eligibility could benefit the LDC that remains in the program by reducing competition in the U.S. market from more advanced developing countries. Assuming that many LDCs would continue to receive the GSP preference under AGOA, other LDCs that might benefit from an LDC-only GSP program are Afghanistan, Bhutan, Burma, Burundi, Cambodia, Congo (Kinshasa), Haiti, Kiribati, Mauritania, Nepal, Samoa, Somalia, South Sudan, the Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste,Tuvalu, and Vanuat.
  • Expand the application of GSP. For example, allow some import-sensitive products to receive preferential access (such as apparel). Increase the flexibility of rules of origin (ROO) requirements. For example, allow more GSP beneficiaries to cumulate inputs with other beneficiaries to meet the 35% domestic content requirement or lower the domestic content requirement. Eliminate competitive need limitations or raise the thresholds. Reauthorize GSP for longer terms or make the program permanent.
  • Restrict Application of Preferences. For example: Consider mandatory graduation for “middle income.” Strengthen provision that allows graduation of individual industry sectors within beneficiary countries. Reform eligibility criteria to strengthen provisions on worker rights as well as introduce new criteria, such as good governance, gender equality, and environmental law and regulation.

U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC)

Congress may examine and weigh in on the TTC’s structure, priorities and scope, and prospects for “success.”

  • TTC’s anticipated prioritization of more recent or urgent issues (such as joint responses to Russia’s aggression in Ukraine), compared to other bilateral trade and technology issues (such as digital inclusion) that were priorities at the time of the TTC launch. Congress may explore potential trade-offs in priorities and/or opportunities to expand the TTC, such as by creating additional working groups or structures to sustain intensified cooperation on major bilateral trade issues. This may include a review of whether to modify the scope of the TTC’s working groups to address bilateral tariffs and other market access issues. Congress also may explore opportunities through the TTC to intensify U.S.-EU cooperation to remove regulatory barriers.
  • Congress may examine the TTC’s prospects for success and its ability to produce concrete outcomes, and also seek to establish the metrics by which to gauge the TTC’s effectiveness.

Congress may examine whether to pursue potential market opening opportunities through the TTC for future formal US-EU FTA talks, or pursue such talks separately. On one hand, potential FTA negotiations that develop out of the TTC could benefit from the intensified cooperation and renewed trust that the TTC may foster. On the other hand, such talks may be limited if they do not address bilateral tariffs or other market access issues.

Appendix: List of CRS reports on trade issues

Author: Sheng Lu

Professor @ University of Delaware

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