The event is hosted by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Secretariat.
About the webinar: This webinar seeks to understand the opportunities offered by the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) Agreement for the garment and textile industry in the region. Considering that the garment and textile industry involves a large number of MSMEs in its supply chain, it would be important to understand how MSMEs can utilise the RCEP Agreement to grow their business and further integrate themselves into the global supply chain, noting that RCEP members are critical apparel-sourcing country for many big global players in the industry.
The first part of the event includes three presentations. 1) textile and apparel trade patterns in the RCEP region and how to read RCEP’s detailed tariff phaseout schedule. 2) RCEP rules of origin for textiles and apparel; and 3) customs procedure
In the second half, three companies from Cambodia, Thailand, and Indonesia shared their perspectives about the potential impact of RCEP on their businesses.
The latest trade data shows that in the first four months of 2022, US apparel imports increased by 40.6% in value and 25.9% in quantity from a year ago. However, the seemingly robust import expansion is shadowed by the rising market uncertainties.
Uncertainty 1: US economy. As the US economic growth slows down, consumers have turned more cautious about discretionary spending on clothing to prioritize other necessities. Notably, in the first quarter of 2022, clothing accounted for only 3.9% of US consumers’ total expenditure, down from 4.3% in 2019 before the pandemic. Likewise, according to the Conference Board, US consumers’ confidence index (CCI) dropped to 106.4 (1985=100) in May 2022 from 113.8 in January 2022, confirming consumers’ increasing anxiety about their household’s financial outlook.
Removing the seasonal factor, US apparel imports in April 2022 went up 2.8% in quantity and 3.0% in value from March 2022, much lower than 9.3% and 11.9% a month ago (i.e., March 2022 vs. February 2022). The notable slowed import growth reflects the negative impact of inflation on US consumers’ clothing spending. According to the Census, the value of US clothing store sales marginally went up by 0.8% in April 2022 from a month ago, also the lowest so far in 2022.
Uncertainty 2: Worldwide inflation. Data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis shows that the price index of US apparel imports reached 103.1 in May 2022 (May 2020=100), up from 100.3 one year ago (i.e., a 2.8% price increase). At the product level (i.e., 6-digit HS Code, HS Chapters 61-62), over 60% of US apparel imports from leading sources such as China, Vietnam, Bangladesh, and CAFTA-DR experienced a price increase in the first quarter of 2022 compared with a year ago. The price surge of nearly 40% of products exceeded 10 percent. As almost everything, from shipping, textile raw materials, and labor to energy, continues to soar, the rising sourcing costs facing US fashion companies are not likely to ease anytime soon.
The deteriorating inflation also heats up the debate on whether to continue the US Section 301 tariff action against imports from China. Since implementing the punitive tariffs, US fashion companies have to pay around $1 billion in extra import duties every year, resulting in the average applied import tariff rate for dutiable apparel items reaching almost 19%. Although some e-commerce businesses took advantage of the so-called “de minimis” rule (i.e., imports valued at $800 or less by one person on a day are not required to pay tariffs), over 99.8% of dutiable US apparel imports still pay duties.
Uncertainty 3: “Made in China.” US apparel imports from China in April 2022 significantly dropped by 26.7% in quantity and 24.6% in value from March 2022 (seasonally adjusted). China’s market shares also fell to a new record low of 26.3% in quantity and 16.8% in value in April 2022. The zero-COVID policy and new lockdown undoubtedly was a critical factor contributing to the decline. Fashion companies’ concerns about the trajectory of the US-China relations and the upcoming implementation of the new Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA) are also relevant factors. For example, only 10.5% of US cotton apparel imports came from China in April 2022, a further decline from about 15% at the beginning of the year. Given the expected challenges of meeting the rebuttable presumption requirements in UFLPA and the high compliance costs, it is not unlikely that US fashion companies may continue to reduce their China exposure.
As US fashion companies source less from China, they primarily move their sourcing orders to China’s competitors in Asia. Measured in value, about 74.8% of US apparel imports came from Asia so far in 2022 (January-April), up from 72.8% a year ago. In comparison, there is no clear sign that more sourcing orders have been permanently moved to the Western Hemisphere. For example, in April 2022, CAFTA-DR members accounted for 9.3% of US apparel imports in quantity (was 10.8% in April 2021) and 10.2% in value (was 11.4% in April 2021).
Uncertainty 4: Shipping delays. Data suggests we are not out of the woods yet for shipping delays and supply chain disruptions. For example, as Table 2 shows, the seasonable pattern of US apparel imports in March 2022 is similar to January before the pandemic (2017-2020). In other words, many US fashion companies still face about 1.5-2 months of shipping delays. Additionally, several of China’s major ports were under strict COVID lockdowns starting in late March, including Shanghai, the world’s largest. Thus, the worsened supply chain disruptions could negatively affect the US apparel import volumes in the coming months.
Congress might assess the U.S. experience with the Phase One process as it debates the merits of the deal and how to leverage it, the effects of the tariffs, and options to advance U.S. economic interests and counter China’s persistent statist economic practices. Specifically:
In light of how difficult it was to secure China’s acknowledgment of its practices of concern and limited commitments in these areas, to what extent may the U.S. reasonably expect talks with Beijing to achieve outcomes that further U.S. policy objectives, when measured against the U.S. resources and efforts required? Does focusing on talks with China take U.S. focus and resources away from efforts to deploy or develop U.S. trade tools and joint approaches with other countries that might be required to protect and advance U.S. economic interests?
Is the executive branch fully using its authorities to address its concerns about China? Are other approaches and measures needed in addition to or separate from tariffs, and if so, what are they? Should the USTR use Section 301 to address other concerns, such as subsidies? What approaches could be pursued, such as prior efforts with Europe and Japan to address non-market economic distortions and subsidies?
Should Congress require the USTR to enforce the Phase One provisions and actively use the Phase One dispute process? Should the USTR challenge China’s industrial policies that appear to violate commitments not to require technology transfer, and its efforts to set global technology licensing and pricing terms, such as through its courts?
How might Congress weigh the tariffs’ effects on U.S. firms and consumers against issues of economic competitiveness? To what extent are tariffs inflationary compared to drivers such as food, energy, housing, labor and supply chain shortages, and monetary policy?
Could tariffs help diversify China-based supply chains and counter China’s subsidies by raising costs vis-à-vis U.S. and third-market products? Could tariffs on goods tied to China’s industrial policies help level the playing field, or would this violate U.S. trade commitments and encourage others to follow suit? USTR proposed but never enacted tariffs on consumer electronics. Could these tariffs counter China’s efforts to deepen technology supply chains in China?
Congress could engage with the Administration to develop and implement guidelines for when and how to grant and extend exclusions. This could potentially promote transparency, consistency, and proper application of standards in reviewing requests, thereby helping to ensure that the USTR carries out Section 301 objectives as prescribed by Congress
What role should Congress play in the negotiation and consideration of an IPEF and other regional trade initiatives? What regional and other multilateral trade commitments would best serve U.S. economic and strategic interests in the region?
What types of enforcement mechanisms would an IPEF include and how would its commitments and enforceability compare to CPTPP and U.S. free trade agreements? What are the tradeoffs of these approaches and should they be pursued in tandem?
How does the expiration of U.S. Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) affect the Administration’s approach to scoping, negotiating, and enacting an IPEF and trade agreements?
AGOA reauthorization. AGOA is authorized through September 2025. US Trade Representative Katherine Tai has urged consideration of improvements to encourage investment, and help small and women-owned businesses and more countries make use of the program. Congress may consider whether and when to reauthorize AGOA and if reforms are needed.
Free trade agreement (FTA) negotiations. An FTA with an AGOA-eligible country would have implications for AGOA and U.S. trade relations in the region. As the Administration, in consultation with Congress, determines whether to pursue trade negotiations in the region, including with Kenya, key considerations include: (1) what flexibilities from typical U.S. FTA commitments are appropriate; (2) potential effects on broader AGOA utilization; and (3) potential effects on regional initiatives like the African Continental Free Trade Area(AfCFTA).
Increased U.S. tariffs. The Trump administration imposed tariff increases (Section 232) on steel and aluminum imports. Congress may examine the tariffs’ effects on AGOA participants.
Third-party agreements. Reciprocal agreements between AGOA beneficiaries and third parties (e.g., EU-South Africa) may disadvantage U.S. exporters. Congress may examine possible U.S. responses.
Congress may consider and advise the Administration on how to prioritize free trade agreement (FTA) talks with Kenya among other U.S. trade policy objectives; whether and in what form to seek renewal of the Trade Promotion Authority (TPA); the scope and extent of potential U.S.-Kenya FTA commitments to pursue; how to ensure an FTA with Kenya and its rules of origin support regional integration efforts and U.S. economic interests; and the potential types of support (e.g., trade capacity building funds) and flexibilities (e.g., phasing in of commitments) to include as appropriate to Kenya’s level of development)
Congress may continue to monitor U.S. trade and economic interests at stake in the UK-EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA)’s implementation. It may consider whether to press the Administration to continue to prioritize resolving specific trade issues and/or renew broader U.S-UK free trade agreement negotiations. In doing so, Congress may examine the potential benefits and costs of further U.S.-UK trade liberalization (or its absence) for the firms and workers in their districts and states.
Many in Congress and in the U.S. industry support a U.S.-UK FTA. Many Members tie their support to ensuring that Brexit outcomes do not undermine the Northern Ireland peace process. A potential TPA renewal debate could heighten these issues. If FTA talks proceed, Congress may monitor and shape them, and consider implementing legislation for a final agreement. Additionally, Members may examine other ways to engage further on bilateral and global trade issues of shared concern, e.g., sectoral regulatory cooperation or dialogues.
The GSP program expired on December 31, 2020. Congress is considering several bills to reauthorize and introduce new eligibility criteria to the program. Some of the proposed eligibility criteria include provisions on human rights, environmental laws, and good governance. Supporters of the proposed eligibility criteria consider it a modernization of the GSP program to address modern-day issues. Others raise concerns that adding new criteria may make the costs of complying with the program outweigh the benefits and discourage beneficiary developing countries’ participation. They may also undermine the core objectives of the program, which is to promote economic development through trade.
Other possible options for GSP include:
Support reciprocal tariff and market access benefit through free trade agreements (FTAs). Some U.S. policymakers have suggested that developing countries might benefit more through WTO multilateral negotiations, FTAs, or some form of agreement that could also provide reciprocal trade benefits and improved market access for the United States.
Authorize GSP only for Least-Developed Countries (LDCs). Narrowing the scope of eligibility could benefit the LDC that remains in the program by reducing competition in the U.S. market from more advanced developing countries. Assuming that many LDCs would continue to receive the GSP preference under AGOA, other LDCs that might benefit from an LDC-only GSP program are Afghanistan, Bhutan, Burma, Burundi, Cambodia, Congo (Kinshasa), Haiti, Kiribati, Mauritania, Nepal, Samoa, Somalia, South Sudan, the Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste,Tuvalu, and Vanuat.
Expand the application of GSP. For example, allow some import-sensitive products to receive preferential access (such as apparel). Increase the flexibility of rules of origin (ROO) requirements. For example, allow more GSP beneficiaries to cumulate inputs with other beneficiaries to meet the 35% domestic content requirement or lower the domestic content requirement. Eliminate competitive need limitations or raise the thresholds. Reauthorize GSP for longer terms or make the program permanent.
Restrict Application of Preferences. For example: Consider mandatory graduation for “middle income.” Strengthen provision that allows graduation of individual industry sectors within beneficiary countries. Reform eligibility criteria to strengthen provisions on worker rights as well as introduce new criteria, such as good governance, gender equality, and environmental law and regulation.
Congress may examine and weigh in on the TTC’s structure, priorities and scope, and prospects for “success.”
TTC’s anticipated prioritization of more recent or urgent issues (such as joint responses to Russia’s aggression in Ukraine), compared to other bilateral trade and technology issues (such as digital inclusion) that were priorities at the time of the TTC launch. Congress may explore potential trade-offs in priorities and/or opportunities to expand the TTC, such as by creating additional working groups or structures to sustain intensified cooperation on major bilateral trade issues. This may include a review of whether to modify the scope of the TTC’s working groups to address bilateral tariffs and other market access issues. Congress also may explore opportunities through the TTC to intensify U.S.-EU cooperation to remove regulatory barriers.
Congress may examine the TTC’s prospects for success and its ability to produce concrete outcomes, and also seek to establish the metrics by which to gauge the TTC’s effectiveness.
Congress may examine whether to pursue potential market opening opportunities through the TTC for future formal US-EU FTA talks, or pursue such talks separately. On one hand, potential FTA negotiations that develop out of the TTC could benefit from the intensified cooperation and renewed trust that the TTC may foster. On the other hand, such talks may be limited if they do not address bilateral tariffs or other market access issues.