The size of the U.S. textile and apparel industry has significantly shrunk over the past decades. However, U.S. textile manufacturing is gradually coming back. Notably, the value added of U.S. textile manufacturing reached $18.88 billion in 2017, the highest level since 2009.
Nevertheless, the share of U.S. textile and apparel
manufacturing in the U.S. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) dropped to only 0.15% in
2017 from 0.57% in 1998, as the case in most advanced economies with a mature industrial
It is also important
to note that U.S. textile and apparel manufacturing is changing in nature.
For example, textiles had accounted for over 80% of the total output of the
U.S. textile and apparel industry as of 2017, up from around 50% in the late 1990s. Meanwhile, clothing had only
accounted for 12% of the total U.S. fiber consumption in 2012 (the latest data
available), whereas the manufacturing of non-apparel textile products in the
United States, such as industrial and technical textiles, has been growing particularly
fast over the past decade.
are NOT coming back to the U.S. textile and apparel industry. In 2018, U.S.
textile manufacturing (NAICS 313 and 314) and apparel manufacturing (NAICS 315)
lost 2,100 and 4,800 jobs respectively. However, improved productivity is one critical
factor behind the job losses.
Regarding international trade, the United States remains a leading textile exporter and apparel importer overall. Interesting enough, both the value of U.S. textile and apparel imports enjoyed much faster growth in 2018 than in the previous years. Notably, for the first time since 2001, the U.S. textile sector (NAICS 313) experienced a trade deficit ($172 million) rather than a trade surplus. Meanwhile, the U.S. trade deficit in apparel (NAICS 315) reached $86,097 million in 2018, up nearly 6% from a year ago. These unusual trade patterns could be partially affected by the U.S.-China tariff war, which didn’t seem to be helpful with solving the trade deficit concerns.
The UK government on March 13, 2019 released the temporary
rates of customs duty on imports if the country leaves the European Union
with no deal. In the case of no-deal Brexit, these tariff rates will take
effect on March 29, 2019 for up to 12
According to the announced plan, around 87% of UK’s imports by value would be eligible for zero-tariff in the no-deal Brexit scenario.
Specifically for apparel products, 113 out of the total 148 tariff lines (8-digit HS code) in Chapter 61 (Knitted apparel) and 145 out of the total 194 tariff lines (8-digit HS code) in Chapter 62 (Woven apparel) will be duty-free. However, other apparel products will be subject to a Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) tariff rate ranging from 6.5% to 12%.
Meanwhile, the UK will offer preferential tariff duty rates for apparel exports from a few countries/programs, including Chile (zero tariff), EAS countries (zero tariff), Faroe Islands (zero tariff), GSP scheme (reduced tariff rate), Israel (zero tariff), Least Developed Countries (LDC) (zero tariff), Palestinian Authority (zero tariff), and Switzerland (zero tariff).
On the other hand, the EU Commission said it would apply the Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) tariff rates on UK’s products in the no-deal Brexit scenario rather than reciprocate.
While U.S. textile manufacturers and the apparel and retail
industries have expressed overall support for the newly reached
US-Mexico-Canada Free Trade Agreement (USMCA or NAFTA2.0), textile producers
and the apparel sector still hold divergent views on certain provisions:
Rule of Origin
USMCA vs. NAFTA1.0: The
USMCA will continue to adopt the “yarn-forward” rules of origin. The USMCA will
also newly require sewing thread, coated fabric, narrow elastic strips, and
pocketing fabric used in apparel and other finished products to be made in a
USMCA country to qualify for duty-free access to the United States.
U.S. textile industry: U.S.
textile manufacturers almost always support a strict “yarn-forward” rules of
origin in U.S free trade agreements and
they support eliminating exceptions to the “yarn forward” rule as well. The
National Council of Textile Organization (NCTO) estimates that a yearly USMCA
market for sewing thread and pocketing fabric of more than $300 million.
U.S. apparel and retail
industries: The U.S. apparel industry opposes “yarn forward” and argues
that apparel should be considered of
North American origin under a more flexible regional “cut and sew” standard,
which would provide maximum flexibility for sourcing, including the use of
foreign-made yarns and fabrics.
Levels (TPL) for Textiles and Apparel
USMCA vs. NAFTA1.0: With some adjustments, the USMCA would continue a program that allows duty-free access for limited quantities of wool, cotton, and man-made fiber apparel made with yarn or fabric produced or obtained from outside the NAFTA region, including yarns and fabrics from China and other Asian suppliers.
U.S. textile industry: The
textile industry contends China is a major
beneficiary of the current NAFTA TPL mechanism, and it strongly pushed for its
complete elimination in the USMCA.
U.S. apparel and retail
industries: U.S. imports of textiles and apparel covered by the tariff preference level mechanism supply 13% of
total U.S. textile and apparel imports from Canada and Mexico. Apparel
producers assert that these exceptions give regional producers flexibility to
use materials not widely produced in North America.
Viewpoints on other Provisions in USMCA
U.S. textile industry: The
U.S. textile industry also opposes the USMCA newly allows visible lining fabric
for tailored clothing could be sourced
from China or other foreign suppliers, and it would permit up to 10% of a
garment’s content, by weight, to come from outside the USMCA region (up from 7%
in NAFTA1.0). The U.S. textile industry also welcomes that the USMCA would add specific textile verification and
customs procedures aimed at preventing fraud and transshipment. Additionally, the U.S. textile industry is also pleased
that the USMCA would end the Kissell
Amendment. The Kissell Amendment is an exception in NAFTA that allows
manufacturers from Canada and Mexico to qualify as “American” sources when Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) buys textiles, clothing, and footwear using
appropriated funds (about $30 million markets
for textiles, clothing, and shoes altogether).
U.S. apparel and retail
industries: Apparel importers are of
concern that the USMCA continue to incorporate the existing NAFTA short
supply procedure, which is extremely difficult to get a new item approved and
added to the list, limiting their flexibility to source apparel with inputs
from outside North America.
Finally, the report argues that “Regardless of whether the USMCA takes effect, the global competitiveness of U.S. textile producers and U.S.-headquartered apparel firms may depend more on their ability to compete against Asian producers than on the USMCA trade rules.”
Last week in FASH455, we discussed the unique critical role played by textile and apparel trade in generating economic growth in many developing countries. The developed countries also use trade policy tools, such as trade preference programs, to encourage the least developed countries (LDCs) making and exporting more apparel. However, a debate on these trade programs is that they have done little to improve the genuine competitiveness of LDCs’ apparel exports in the world marketplace, but instead have made LDCs rely heavily on these trade programs to continue their apparel exports. Here is one more example:
With growing concerns about “the deterioration of democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law in Cambodia”, in a statement made on February 12, 2019, the European Union says it has started the process that could lead to a temporary suspension of Cambodia’s eligibility for EU’s Everything But Arms (EBA) program. Specifically, the EU process will include the following three stages:
Stage 1: six
months of intensive monitoring and engagement with the Cambodian government;
Stage 2: another three months for the EU to produce a
report based on the findings in stage 1
Stage 3: after
a total of twelve months in stages 1
& 2, the EU Commission will conclude the procedure with a final decision on
whether or not to withdraw tariff preferences; it is also at this stage that
the Commission will decide the scope and duration of the withdrawal. Any
withdrawal would come into effect after a further six-month period.
However, the EU
Commission also stressed that launching the temporary withdrawal procedure does
not entail an immediate removal of Cambodia’s preferential access to the EU
market, which “would be the option of last resort.”
Developed in 2001, the EBA program establishes duty-free and quota-free
treatment for all Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in the EU market. EBA includes
almost all industries other than arms and armaments. As of February 2019, there
EBA beneficiary countries.
The EBA program has benefited the apparel sector in particular given clothing accounts for the lion’s share in many LDCs’ total merchandise exports. Because of the preferential duty benefits provided by EBA, many LDCs can compete with other competitive apparel powerhouses such as China. Notably, the EBA program also adopts the “cut and sew” rules of origin for apparel, which is more general than the “double transformation” rules of origin typically required by EU free trade agreement and trade preference programs. Under the “cut and sew” rule, Cambodia’s apparel exports to the EU can enjoy the import duty-free treatment while using yarns and fabrics sourced from anywhere in the world.
Cambodia is a major apparel supplier for the EU market, accounting for approximately 4% of EU’s
total apparel imports in 2017. Exporting
apparel to EU through the EBA program is also of particular importance to
Cambodia economically. In 2016, the apparel sector created over 500,000
jobs in Cambodia, of whom 86% were female, working in 556 registered factories.
According to Eurostat, of EU’s €4.9bn imports from Cambodia in 2017, around 74.9% were apparel (HS chapters 61 and
62). Meanwhile, of EU’s €3.7bn apparel imports from Cambodia in 2017, as high
as 96.6% claimed the EBA benefits. Understandably,
losing the EBA eligibility could hurt Cambodia’s apparel exports to the EU significantly.
#1 President Trump has been proposing many tariffs on imports from foreign countries such as China. Do you think that these high tariffs will actually drive more production into North American manufacturers and promote the US economy, or will it hurt the U.S. and inflate the costs of U.S. production? Why?
#2 In class we discussed that trade creates winners and
losers. So will President Trump’s high tariffs create winners and losers too?
Who are they? Also, why should or should not government use trade policy to pick
up winners and losers in international trade?
#3 What are some possible solutions to the trade deficit
between the United States and China other than high tariffs? Why or why not trade
deficit is a problem to worry about?
#4 If Trump is able to impose more tariffs and even the
playing field with China, will a new “China” arise from a rivaling country,
which can continue to pressure US manufacturers? Why?
#5 Why does Columbia refuse to bring production to the US,
as Trump would like?
#6 Columbia has been designing products to specifically get
around the tariffs set by President Trump which creates trade loopholes for
their company. Do you think that it is ethical for them to do this? Why or why
#7 If President Trump keeps raising tariffs and wants goods
to be made domestically, how will other countries respond to this with all of
their excess goods?
#8 Why would President Trump continue to advocate and push
for this tariff even if an overwhelming amount if businesses are hurt by it,
finding ways around it, or getting excused from its implications? Do the pros
outweigh the cons?
[For FASH455: 1)
Please mention the question number in your comments; 2) Please address at least
TWO questions in your comments]
“Globotics” or Globalization + Artificial intelligence (AI) is changing the world. Globotics means globalization mixed with new kinds of robotics, from artificial intelligence to technologies that make it easier to outsource services jobs. Particularly, globotics is injecting pressure into our socio-politico-economic system (via job displacement) faster than our system can absorb it (via job replacement). Overall, AI and robots will take jobs — but make the world better.
Past globalization and automation were mostly about goods— making them and shipping them. However, the era of globotics is about service-sector automation—driven by information and data.
The competition from software robots and telemigrants will seem monstrously unfair to white collar works who lost their jobs. When white-collar workers start sharing the same pain [as blue-collar workers], some sort of backlash is inevitable.
As technologies reduce the need for face-to-face contact, some developing nations stand to benefit. For example, India, with its sizeable English-speaking population and armies of techies, could become a hub for services outsourcing, just as China was for manufacturing.
Future jobs (that are left) will be more human and involve more face-to-face contact since software robots and tele-migrants will do everything else. In other words, the future economy will be more local and more human.
The problem is the short-term. In the era of globotics, it is important to make the rapid job displacement politically acceptable to a majority of voters. Governments may set the policy goal to protect workers, not jobs.